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Over the last quarter century, a profound restructuring of U.S. labor
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markets has occurred. Long-term job tenure, internal labor markets, and
employer-sponsored benefits have waned under the pressures of neoliberal
globalization. The trend is toward increasingly precarious, shorter-term,
serial employment relationships that offer significantly lower wages,
reduced job-related benefits, and formidable obstacles to the exercise of
employment rights. 1 This fundamental shift has moved so-called “nonstandard” employment arrangements, once viewed as marginal, into the
core economy. As a result, a remarkable array of profit-driven labor market
intermediaries (LMIs) are now embedded in mainstream labor markets.
Temporary help and staffing agencies, payrolling and employee leasing
firms, and other for-profit, labor-only contractors are now integral to
“flexible” staffing practices and just-in-time production methods being
used in industries as varied as software engineering, building construction,
manufacturing, legal and accounting services, and healthcare. 2 For-profit
LMIs are prospering in today’s high velocity labor markets, 3 contributing
to the dominant lean-market paradigm by enabling the rapid movement of
workers through serial, short-term, no-frills employment arrangements.
A unique array of workplace ills is associated with the operation of
profit-driven LMIs in casual and high-velocity labor markets. 4 Legal
disputes involving temporary workers (temps) deployed by commercial
LMIs have challenged the denial of earned pension benefits 5 and the
1. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE
CHANGING WORKPLACE 67-83 (2004); see generally GUY STANDING, GLOBAL LABOUR FLEXIBILITY:
SEEKING DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 49-289 (1999).
2. See, e.g., Marcelo Estevao & Saul Lach, The Evolution of the Demand for Temporary Help
Supply Employment in the U.S., in NONSTANDARD WORK: THE NATURE AND CHALLENGES OF
CHANGING EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS 123, 130-40 (Francoise Carre et al., eds., 2000); David
Finegold et al., A Temporary Route to Advancement?: The Career Opportunities for Low-Skilled
Workers in Temporary Employment, in LOW–WAGE AMERICA: HOW EMPLOYERS ARE RESHAPING
OPPORTUNITY IN THE WORKPLACE 317, 340-47 (Eileen Applebaum et al., eds., 2006); Arne L.
Kalleberg et al., Externalizing Employment: Flexible Staffing Arrangements in US Organizations 32
SOC. SCI. RES. 525, 530, tbl. 2 (2003) (compiling organizational studies of flexible staffing
arrangements in the U.S.); Anne E. Polivka et al., Definition, Composition, and Economic
Consequences of the Nonstandard Workforce, in NONSTANDARD WORK, supra, at 41, 69-72, tbls. 4a,
4b.
3. See CHRIS BENNER ET AL., STAIRCASES OR TREADMILLS? LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES
AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN A CHANGING ECONOMY 4 (2007); STONE, supra note 1, at 69-70;
Jamie Peck et al., Constructing Markets for Temporary Labour: Employment Liberalization and the
Internationalization of the Staffing Industry, 5 GLOBAL NETWORKS 3 (2005); Douglas J. Miller & Jay
B. Barney, Employer Perspectives: Competing Through A Flexible Workforce, in THE SHADOW
WORKFORCE: PERSPECTIVES ON CONTINGENT WORK IN THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND EUROPE 65,
83-90 (Sandra E. Gleason ed., 2006).
4. See Steven L. Willborn, Leased Workers: Vulnerability and the Need for Special Legislation,
19 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 85, 85-95 (1997).
5. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the employer’s
recognition that workers were employees, rather than independent contractors, made workers eligible
for ERISA benefits, even though workers were labeled independent contractors in employment
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limited access to unemployment insurance 6 and workers’ compensation. 7
The refusal of employers to collectively bargain over temps’ terms of
employment has been challenged, 8 and temps have sought redress for the
failure of temporary staffing agencies to provide legally mandated safety
equipment. 9 Other untoward, but widely used practices of the commercial
LMI remain largely beyond the reach of contemporary workplace law.
Recruiting temps with false promises of permanent employment, using
contracting methods to conceal the rate of exploitation of the temporary
work force, and restricting temps’ access to permanent employment at
client firms are not legally cognizable injuries under the current workplace
law paradigm. 10 On the macro level, the proliferation of profit-driven LMIs
has engendered a second-tier workforce numbering in the millions. The
lower pay scales and non-existent benefits suffered by the temp agency
workforce constitute a “hidden fee” that for-profit LMIs extract for the
“privilege” of being deployed in the labor market. These normative
practices undermine the economic security of all workers by reducing the
pressure on employers to raise the wages and provide benefits 11 to the socalled “standard” workforce. Profit-driven LMIs also weaken the existing
regulatory regime of workplace law by shielding employers who use
temporary staffing agencies from the legal and contractual obligations they
would otherwise have to a segment of their workforce. 12
agreements).
6. NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, MENDING THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA- TION
SAFETY NET FOR CONTINGENT WORKERS 32-37 (1997), available at <http://nelp. 3cdn.net/
36ec3b0332f754a030_0vm6iyr99.pdf> (last visited July 20, 2009).
7. See, e.g., White v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 388 N.W.2d 274 (Mich. App. 1986) (contesting under
Michigan’s workers compensation laws the user firm’s status as an employer of a temp); see also
Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers
without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 266-67
(2006).
8. See M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000), rev’d in part, Oakwood Care Center, 343
N.L.R.B. 76 (2004).
9. See, e.g., News Release, OSHA Region 4, USDOL: 00-201, OSHA Fines Orange City, Fla.,
Waste Hauling Company $122,500 Following Worker Fatality (Nov. 1, 2000), available at
<http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=350
> (temp worker fatality resulting from failure to provide personal protective equipment) (last visited on
July 20, 2009).
10. See, e.g., Danielle D. van Jaarsveld, Overcoming Obstacles to Worker Representation:
Insights from the Temporary Agency Workforce, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 355, 367-70 (2005-06).
11. Workers deployed through profit-driven LMIs, like most nonstandard workers, experience a
pervasive absence of fringe benefits. See ROBERT E. PARKER, FLESH PEDDLERS AND WARM BODIES:
THE TEMPORARY HELP INDUSTRY AND ITS WORKERS 112-14, 137-53 (1994); Kalleberg et al., supra
note 2, at 540 (finding that 41 percent of managers turn to temp agencies to lower costs by avoiding
payment of fringe benefits); Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The High-Pressure U.S. Labor
Market of the 1990s, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, Nov. 1999, at 1.
12. See David Autor, Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of Unjust Dismissal Doctrine to the
Growth of Employment Outsourcing, 21 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (2003); Guy Davidov, Joint Employer Status
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Legal scholars, however, have given little attention to the relationship
between the unique mode of exploitation experienced by workers in
triangular employment relationships and the legal status of for-profit LMIs
under U.S. workplace law. With few exceptions, federal and state work
laws classify and treat for-profit LMIs as “employers,” a dubious and, at
best, incomplete assignation that has left both the market-mediating and
job-brokering functions of profit-driven LMIs unregulated. Because
modern workplace law retains a bipolar foundation that identifies only
employers and those who work for them, its “zone of statutory
protection” 13 offers a crabbed and problematic paradigm that fails to
address the workplace ills that arise in mediated employment relationships
involving employers, employees, and for-profit LMIs. 14
This article argues that regulation of profit-driven job brokering –
particularly the so-called mark-up, i.e. the difference between the wages
paid to a temp worker and the contract price a user firm pays the temp
agency for “use” of a temp – is essential to rectify the second-class status
of the ever-growing workforce being deployed by commercial LMIs. Such
regulation requires construction of a distinct legal status for profit-driven
LMIs that encapsulates an LMI’s dual role in triangular employment
relationships, i.e. as the employer of record for temporary workers and its
fundamental institutional role as a job broker that negotiates the terms
under which labor is deployed to the employer’s locus of production or
service provision. To this end, the argument has five parts. Part II identifies
the fundamental features of mediated, high velocity labor markets and
examines the distinct workplace ills attendant to the widespread operation
of profit-driven LMIs. This examination particularly focuses on the
commercial temporary help or staffing agency, the largest and most widely
utilized LMI in today’s labor markets. Part III recounts the labor struggles
and legislative initiatives of the Progressive Era aimed at curbing the
exploitive practices of labor contractors and private employment agencies,
the scourge of late nineteenth and early twentieth century labor markets and
the progenitors of today’s profit-driven LMIs. Progressive era reformers
and labor activists not only succeeded in enacting laws regulating the
“employment sharks,” they advanced the use of public labor exchanges to
in Triangular Employment Relationships, 42 BRITISH J. INDUS. REL. 727, 736 (2004); Frances Raday,
The Insider-Outsider Politics of Labor-Only Contracting, 20 COMP. LAB. L & POL’Y. J. 413, 416-19
(1999).
13. Stephen Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective on Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LABOR L. 153, 165 (2003).
14. See Virginia L. duRivage et al., Making Labor Law Work for Part-Time and Contingent
Workers, in CONTINGENT WORK: AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN TRANSITION 263 (Kathleen
Barker & Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998); Willborn, supra note 4, at 88.
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provide a not-for-profit institution that could pair workers with jobs. Part
IV examines the socio-legal factors that marginalized the employment
agency business in the New Deal era and the rise of the comprehensive
federal labor law scheme that arose to regulate the union hiring hall,
organized labor’s answer to private, profit-driven, employer-controlled
modes of hiring. Part V recounts the largely ignored legislative campaign
undertaken in the 1960s by the young temporary staffing industry that has
allowed most profit-driven LMIs to avoid virtually all government
regulation of its brokering and mediating functions for the last four
decades. In Part VI we assess recent legislative reforms affecting temporary
workers deployed by for-profit LMIs and the significance of nascent
government and labor-sponsored LMIs that are developing as alternatives
to the commercial LMI paradigm. This discussion highlights the
significance of worker centers run by day-laborers and the rise of new
forms of the public labor exchange, the government sponsored, unionorganized home-care authority, i.e. an LMI created in many states that has
raised wages and improved work conditions for hundreds of thousands of
low-wage, casually employed home health-care aids. The Conclusion
proposes core elements of a regulatory scheme that can protect the rights
and interests of agency workers deployed by profit-driven LMIs in order to
create a legal climate that can redress the myriad social problems arising
from their hegemony in contemporary high-mobility labor markets.
II. PROFIT-DRIVEN TRIANGULAR EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS IN
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY LABOR MARKETS
A. Types of For-Profit Labor Market Intermediaries
LMIs are commonly defined in terms of what is presumed to be their
core function, as institutions engaged in active job matching. 15 This
characterization, however, trivializes certain other key and sometimes
primary functions served by LMIs and leaves some types of intermediaries
completely out of the picture. So-called “employment leasing” and
“payrolling” firms, for instance, are not involved in recruiting workers or in
“matching” them with employers. These LMIs place workers that have
been recruited by the client firm, or who are already in employment with
the client firm, on their own payroll, thereby becoming what has come to
be called the “employer of record.” 16 The common definition of LMIs, as
15. See, e.g., BENNER ET AL., supra note 3, at 10-11.
16. Many temporary or staffing agencies engaged in recruitment and matching also perform this
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Professor Paul Osterman points out, fails to recognize important
distinctions that identify different types of LMIs. Osterman labels as
“traditional” those LMIs that “passively accept job orders from firms and
match these orders with people who have registered with the
intermediary.” 17 Traditional intermediaries include job-matching websites
like Monster.com and state-sponsored and funded departments of
employment and training. More important for our analysis are those LMIs
that Osterman describes as “more active and aggressive in their relations to
both sides of the labor market.” 18 In addition to job placement and skills
training, these LMIs may “bargain with firms or deploy power in order to
alter firm behavior.” 19 In other words, this group of LMIs is
“interventionist,” having the effect of “changing the terms of trade in the
labor market.” 20
We employ this understanding of the various types and functions of
LMIs in order to identify the broad range of institutions currently operating
as brokers in the employment relationship. This includes the ubiquitous
temporary help agency that deploys workers at all skill levels to
manufacturers, health care institutions, and a range of service industries. It
also allows for consideration of union-sponsored hiring halls that provide a
portal of entry into the job market for the skilled construction trades,
entertainment workers, and longshoremen as well as the scores of workers
centers 21 that offer day laborers a more structured, less-exploitive
alternative to street-corner hiring.
This broader definition permits a comparative and historical analysis
of LMIs that can take stock of the societal benefits and ills that are
unevenly distributed among these various forms. It also facilitates an
assessment of the widely disparate regulatory regimes that govern different
kind of “payrolling” or “leasing” as one of their “services.” It is important to note that the contract
negotiated between the leasing firm and the client-employer usually alters the terms of employment.
DAVID WEST, PEOS AND PAYROLLING: A HISTORY OF PROBLEMS AND A FUTURE WITHOUT BENEFITS
(2001), <http://www.cfcw.org/PEO.pdf> (last visited on July 20, 2009); see also Peggie R. Smith et al.,
Contingent Workers: Lesson 5: Proceedings of the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
661, 665-69 (2001) (comments of Stephen Strong).
17. PAUL OSTERMAN, SECURING PROSPERITY: THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET: HOW IT HAS
CHANGED AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 134 (1999).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.; see also, BENNER ET AL., supra note 3, at 10-11 (describing LMIs like temp and staffing
agencies as engaging in “active job matching”); Robert P. Giloth, Introduction: A Case for Workforce
Intermediaries, in WORKFORCE INTERMEDIARIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3, 6-8 (Robert P.
Giloth ed., 2004).
21. See JANICE FINE, WORKERS CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE
DREAM 11-14 (2006).
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types of LMIs that perform equivalent socio-economic functions in today’s
labor markets. This, in turn, allows for a discussion of two interconnected,
historically contingent questions: First, what form of LMI best serves the
interests of the non-standard labor market at a time when wages,
employment benefits and job security are on the decline; and second, can
improved regulation create socio-legal conditions that permit not-for-profit
LMIs to challenge the hegemony of the commercial LMI by offering better
wages and benefits for the non-standard workforce while still successfully
performing job-matching for employers?
B. The Socioeconomic Framework: The Indispensable Role of Labor
Market Intermediaries in High Velocity Labor Markets
For-profit LMIs – including temp agencies, employee leasing firms
and all variety of commercial “middle-men” – deploy workers in virtually
every economic sector, effectuating employment relationships that are by
design short-term, seasonal, or cyclical. 22 Recent data suggests that this
trend is ongoing, 23 with three forms of commercial LMIs occupying the
field. The temporary help agency comprises 71 percent of the commercial
LMI industry, followed by the professional employer organization (PEO)
which accounts for 21 percent. 24 The “traditional” employment agency,
including specialized “headhunting” operations, accounts for only 8 percent
of the industry. 25 The temporary staffing agency clearly dominates and,
therefore, is the focus of our discussion of commercial LMIs.
The size of the workforce deployed by LMIs in any given industry or
enterprise varies widely. At one extreme, the use of commercial LMIs has
spawned a new category of enterprise, aptly labeled “non-employers”:
22. In 1997, 46 percent of U.S. firms used some form of labor market intermediary to hire
workers. Including arrangements not involving an intermediary, e.g. independent contractors, shortterm hires, and on call workers, 78 percent of private sector employers engaged temporary or contingent
workers using a variety of “flexible staffing arrangements.” See Dale Belman & Lonnie Golden,
Nonstandard and Contingent Employment: Contrasts by Job Type, Industry and Occupation, in
NONSTANDARD WORK supra note 2, at 167, 169.
23. Deployment by commercial LMIs continues to rise, accounting for 10 percent of the net
employment growth in the last decade of the twentieth century. See George A. Erickcek et al., The
Effects of Temporary Services and Contracting Out on Low-Skilled Workers: Evidence from Auto
Suppliers, Hospitals, and Public Schools, in LOW-WAGE AMERICA, supra note 2, at 368.
24. Matthew Dey et al., Manufacturers’ Outsourcing to Employment Services 4 (Upjohn Staff
Working Paper No. 07-132, 2006), available at <http://www.upjohn.org/publications/ wp/07-132.pdf>.
PEOs, previously known as employment leasing companies, often lease an entire workforce back to the
client company. However, the percentage of workers in a given facility deployed by the much larger
temporary staffing industry can approach similar levels. A recent study describes a package delivery
firm outside a large metropolitan area in the southeast that employed 270 persons; only eight were
permanent employees, the rest were temp agency hires. Finegold et al., supra note 2, at 343.
25. See Dey et al., supra note 24, at 4 (basing information on 2005 labor force data).
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business enterprises that own productive capital and produce goods or
services, but, legally speaking, employ no one; the entire workforce is
provided by employment agents 26 or labeled as independent contractors. In
most circumstances, however, agency workers constitute a smaller fraction
of the client’s workforce, hired for low-cost, short-term work and to
accommodate rapid shifts in production levels. 27 Temp agencies are often
the source of labor for undesirable, repetitive, or physically demanding jobs
where high turnover is endemic, e.g., assembly work, packing and loading
jobs, and “low-end” health care industry jobs. 28 Commercial LMIs are also
used to accommodate seasonal or short-term business fluctuations or to fill
an intermittent need for specialized skill sets. 29 Increasingly, temp agencies
are performing secondary human resource functions by providing user
firms with a means of screening potential hires; in effect, temp agencies are
engaged to create a pre-probationary period of employment to select the
most productive individuals who best “fit” firm culture 30 and, in some
cases, to weed out union-minded individuals. 31 While short-term cyclical
jobs are the norm for temporary staffing industry, the deployment of socalled perma-temps – individuals deployed by an agency who have the
same assignment for more than a year, acquiring long-term, second-class
status in a given workplace – has also risen. In 2005 “perma-temps”
accounted for more than one-third of temp agency workers. 32
Commercial LMIs have become a structural force in the global
economy. In any given labor market, the percentage of the workforce
deployed by temporary agencies can be significant. 33 Addeco, Inc., the
26. Molly Selvin & Molly Hennessy-Fiske, L.A. Area Leads in Employers That Aren’t, L.A.
TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A1.
27. For instance, a study that included the use of temps by Michigan auto industry parts supplier,
found temp agency workers comprising between 15 and 25 percent of a factory’s workforce. Erickcek,
supra note 23, at 380-82.
28. See Jamie Peck & Nick Theodore, Flexible Recession: The Temporary Staffing Industry and
Mediated Work in the United States, 31 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 171, 172-73 (2007).
29. See, e.g., JACKIE KRASAS ROGERS, TEMPS: THE MANY FACES OF THE CHANGING WORKPLACE
127-51 (2000) (providing a detailed ethnographic account of lawyers employed by temp agencies).
30. See VICKI SMITH & ESTHER B. NEUWIRTH, THE GOOD TEMP 69-72 (2008); Erickcek, supra
note 23, at 379-80.
31. See, e.g., Erickcek, supra note 23, at 380.
32. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2006/2007, at 9 (2006).
However, many firms are now insisting that long-term “temp” assignments be limited to one year in
order to avoid the legal liabilities that may attach if the temps are viewed as permanent employees
under federal employment or tax laws. See, e.g., Finegold et al., supra note 2, at 319; see also Vizcaino
v. Microsoft, 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that long term temps may be entitled to stock
options offered to permanent employees).
33. For example, a study comparing California’s Silicon Valley area with Milwaukee indicated
that over a three-year period, 15 percent of the workforce (between ages twenty-five to sixty-five)
obtained work through a temp agency. See Laura Leete et al., Labor Market Intermediaries in the Old
and New Economies: A Survey of Worker Experiences in Milwaukee and Silicon Valley, in
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world’s largest temporary help agency, had international revenues of more
than twenty-three billion dollars in 2005 34 and as of 2009, deployed more
than 700,000 workers daily. 35 Manpower, Inc., placed four million people
in permanent and temporary job positions in 2008, earning profits of more
than $ 647 million 36 on contracts with 400,000 employers, including small
and medium size businesses, as well as the world’s largest multinational
corporations. 37 Multinational temporary staffing corporations like Labor
Ready, Manpower, or Addeco are “equal opportunity” institutions,
operating at multiple entry points in the labor market. 38 In many labor
markets, the multinational temporary staffing agencies are supplemented by
local or specialized, industry-specific temp operations that often use welldeveloped social networks to solicit and dispense highly skilled
professionals to corporate offices and IT firms 39 or to deploy unskilled
laborers to low-wage manual labor, clerical, or service jobs. 40 Some lowwage staffing agencies also operate in the unregulated, informal economy
deploying undocumented immigrants to unscrupulous employers. 41
The significance of the profit-driven LMI, however, cannot be
assessed by totaling up the number of temps these institutions deploy. 42
WORKFORCE INTERMEDIARIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 20, at 263, 268.
Moreover, several times the number employed are “registered” at agencies each day, i.e., an even larger
number of workers are part of the reserve for the temporary labor market at any given time.
34. Neil Coe et al., Mapping the Globalization of the Temporary Staffing Industry, 59 PROF.
GEOGRAPHER 503, 508 (2007).
35. Adecco, The World Leader in Workforce Solutions, <http://www.adeccousa.com/
AboutUs/Pages/CorporateOverview.aspx?submenuid=2.0> (last visited July 28, 2009) (including all
workers deployed in over seventy countries and territories).
36. MANPOWER INC. 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 14, 17 (2009), available at <http://files.share
holder.com/downloads/MAN/691094753x0x276784/27885379-A46B-4010-9C80-AE9AB0AB4
C9A/MANPOWER_AR_08LR.pdf>.
37. About Manpower, <http://www.manpower.com/about/about.cfm> (last visited July 28, 2009).
38. See Polivka et al., supra note 2, at 69-72. See generally Kalleberg et al., supra note 2
(summarizing organizational studies on size, scope and use of temporary and staffing agencies
throughout the U.S. economy).
39. See, e.g., STEPHEN R. BARLEY & GIDEON KUNDA, GURUS, HIRED GUNS, AND WARM BODIES:
ITINERANT WORKERS IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (2004); Daniel Kerr & Christopher Dole, Cracking
the Temp Trap: Day Laborers’ Grievances and Strategies for Change in Cleveland, Ohio, 29 LAB.
STUD. J. 87, 87-108 (2005).
40. See, e.g., ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE REPORT:
UNREGULATED WORK IN THE GLOBAL CITY 25-26 (2007); Tom Juravich, Guatemalans in New Bedford
(2008) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
41. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 40, at 25-26.
42. According to official statistics, temp agency workers account for roughly three out of each
hundred jobs on a typical work day. Peck & Theodore, supra note 28, at 172. In 2001, the U.S. temp
industry reported 21,696 temp and staffing agencies (offices), Timothy Brogan, Scaling New Heights:
Annual Analysis of the Staffing Industry, STAFFING SUCCESS, May-June 2001, at, _____4, and the
average daily employment by the temporary help staffing industry stood at 2.54 million. Finegold et al.,
supra note 2, at 320. At its peak, in September 2000, the industry employed about 3.5 million workers
on any given day. But this daily employment figure is deceptive and underestimates the number of
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The importance of the commercial LMI is its diffusion and integration into
almost every labor market, 43 spreading and legitimizing a range of
mediated work relationships that serve a variety of core functions in
today’s labor markets. The temporary workforce deployed by LMIs is no
longer merely an ad hoc substitution for an otherwise standard job. Now,
commercial intermediaries shape job design and impact how the labor force
is supervised and controlled. 44 They have become an integral institutional
feature of flexible and just-in-time production patterns. As the
disaggregation of the labor force continues in both the manufacturing and
service sectors of the economy, profit-driven LMIs are increasingly used to
facilitate the global economy’s evolving patterns of cost-cutting and
outsourcing. The workforce deployed by commercial LMIs is routinely
factored into human resource decision-making, such that the temporary
staffing industry “can now be regarded as a stable component of the
regulatory infrastructure of the labor market,” 45 actively engaged in
restructuring both the supply and demand sides of the labor market
equation. 46
C. The Discontents of Temping: Characteristics of Mediated Employment
through Profit-Driven Labor Market Intermediaries
Unique social ills and modes of exploitation have always been
associated with “labor-only” contractors that mediate employment
relationships. 47 The temp and staffing industry, the primary labor-only
contractors in contemporary labor markets, rests on an exploitive paradigm
with two basic components. The first component is hyper-precarious
employment that substantially increases the vulnerability of the temp
agency workforce. The use of temp or staffing agencies facilitates the

workers deployed through temp agencies. Because turnover in the temporary industry is endemic, and
the number of individuals deployed on a given day represents only one-fifth to one-quarter of the
number a large temp agency deploys yearly, the number of persons who worked as temps in 1999 was
between 9.6 and 12 million people – almost 10 percent of the working population. Id. at 317, 320.
Further, a significant number of temps – perhaps millions – are deployed by agencies operating in the
informal or “underground” sector. See, e.g., Michael Riley, Labor Brokers Cut Costs, Corners: FastGrowing Firms Exploit Immigrants to Feed Construction Industry, DENVER POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at A1.
43. As long ago as 1996, 78 percent of business establishments reported using at least one form of
flexible staffing arrangements. Susan Houseman, Why Employers Use Flexible Staffing Arrangements:
Evidence from an Establishment Survey, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 149, 151 (2001).
44. SMITH & NEUWIRTH, supra note 30, at 69-97.
45. Peck & Theodore, supra note 28, at 182.
46. Leete et al., supra note 33, at 263, 264.
47. Frances Raday, The Insider-Outsider Politics of Labor-Only Contracting, 20 COMP. LABOR L.
& POLICY J. 413, 416 (1999); see also Willborn, supra note 4, at 88-89.
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routine removal of temps from the workforce without the attendant legal
and moral obligations that attach to the layoff or termination of employees
hired under the standard employment paradigm. The precariousness of the
employment relationship is exacerbated by the persistent presence of the
marginal, “fly-by-night” temping agencies that can easily enter and leave a
labor market because of the inordinately low level of capital outlay needed
to start a temp agency. The second part of the paradigm is the temp agency
workers’ second-tier wages and virtually non-existent benefits. Profitdriven LMIs in ongoing triangular employment relationships are positioned
to siphon off or capture a portion of the revenue stream generated by the
economic enterprise before it reaches workers. The super-exploitation of
temp workers derives in large part from the substantial difference between
the hourly billing rate the agency charges the user firm and the hourly wage
paid workers. This difference, or mark-up, constitutes a hidden fee charged
to temp workers. 48 The “take” of the temporary or staffing agency usually
ranges from 25 to 50 percent of the hourly rate it charges the user firm for
each hour of a temp worker’s use, 49 far above the levels that state
regulations historically permitted for fees charged by for-profit
employment agents. 50
Studies spanning several decades document the panoply of abuses and
problems perpetrated by temp agencies that are either unique to the temp
industry’s workforce or exacerbated by the industry’s mode of operation. 51
A common complaint of temps is agency favoritism and arbitrary decisionmaking in job assignments that belie industry claims that it uses “state of
the art technology, sophisticated procedures” and skill testing that

48. George Gonos, Fee-Splitting Revisited: Concealing Surplus Value in the Temporary
Employment Relationship, 29 POL. & SOC’Y 589, 596-98, 600-02 (2001).
49. BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES DEPT., AFL-CIO, TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT
AGENCIES IN CONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL 10 (2000) (estimating mark-up at 30-50%); Gonos, supra
note 48, at 600-03; Shulamit Kahn, The Bottom-Line Impact of Nonstandard Jobs on Companies’
Profitability and Productivity, in NONSTANDARD WORK, supra note 2, at 241.
50. Compare, for instance, the maximum fees set by various state statutes in 1960 as discussed in
BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULLETIN NO. 209, STATE LAWS REGULATING
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES 12-16 (1960).
51. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 10349, A Bill to Establish and Protect the Rights of Day Laborers
Before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the H. Committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong.
(1971); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-91-56, WORKERS AT RISK: INCREASED
NUMBERS IN CONTINGENT EMPLOYMENT LACK INSURANCE, OTHER BENEFITS, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1991); see also, e.g., KEVIN HENSON, JUST A TEMP
(1996); PARKER, supra note 11; ROGERS, supra note 29. For journalistic coverage see, e.g., George
Getschow, Dirty Work: The Day Laborer’s Toil Is Hard, Pay Minimal, Security Nonexistent. WALL ST.
J., June 22, 1983, at 1; George Getschow, Dirty Work: Louisiana Labor Camps Supply “Warm Bodies”
The Oil Business Needs, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1983, at 1.
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“accurately” matches a temp’s skill set with an appropriate job. 52 The
promise of skills training used to entice workers to join the temporary
workforce is, in fact, often training of only rudimentary skills and only
offered during a time when one would ordinarily be working. 53 A range of
problems arise from the fact that temps are not provided a written record of
the terms they have been promised by the agency, leaving them vulnerable
to “bait-and-switch” tactics. Consider the promise to match a temp to a
work assignment of an appropriate skill level. The match may appear
rational and satisfactory from the vantage point of the user firm, but
ethnographic data shows that temps are often compelled to accept
assignments below their skill level if they want to remain in line for the
possibility of future placement at a higher wage and an appropriate skill
level. 54 More often than not, the temp is neither paid for work performed at
a higher skill level than that for which she was hired nor rewarded with an
improved job assignment. 55 This kind of “task flexibility” increases the rate
of exploitation of the temp agency workforce. 56
The exploitation of temp workers is most easily measured by their
appreciably lower pay when compared to core employees doing the same
or similar work, and the almost universal absence of employer-paid health
and retirement benefits. 57 According to data from 2005, the most recent
data available for comparison, the median weekly income for “full-time”
temporary agency workers is $414 58 compared to a median weekly income
of $653 for full time wage and salary workers. 59 Where temps are
52. ROGERS, supra note 29, at 31 (quoting promotional material distributed in 1992 by the
National Association of Temporary and Staffing Services); see also Tim Bartley & Wade T. Roberts,
Relational Exploitation: The Informal Organization of Day Labor Agencies, 9 WORKING USA: J. LAB.
& SOC’Y 41 (2006).
53. ROGERS, supra note 29 at 35-36.
54. Id. at 57-65.
55. Id.
56. It is not uncommon for highly educated individuals to be hired to fill clerical jobs at low
hourly rates and nevertheless end up performing jobs which utilize their specialized skills and education
(for example, to write speeches or provide advice on insurance planning). Id. at 22.
57. ARNE KALLEBERG, ET AL., NON-STANDARD WORK, SUBSTANDARD JOBS: FLEXIBLE WORK
ARRANGEMENTS IN THE U.S. — (1997) (6.3% of temp agency workers are provided with health
insurance by the agency and 3.1% are provided with pension coverage); Steven Hipple & Jay Stewart,
Earnings and Benefits of Workers In Alternative Work Arrangements, 119 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct.
1996, at 46, 48 (5.7% of temp agency workers are provided health insurance by the agency and 2.5%
are provided pension coverage).
58. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE
EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS, FEBRUARY 2005 tbl. 13, available at <http://www.bls.gov/news.
release/pdf/conemp.pdf>; see also Courtney von Hippel et al., Operationalizing the Shadow Workforce:
Toward an Understanding of the Participants in Nonstandard Employment Relationships, in THE
SHADOW WORKFORCE, supra note 3, at 29, 43 (citing 2005 Bureau of Labor Statistics data).
59. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USUAL WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE
AND SALARY WORKERS: FIRST QUARTER 2005, at 1, available at <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
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integrated into the regular workforce, their hourly wage can range from
about three-fourths to slightly more than one-half the hourly wage of new
hires employed directly by the user firm who perform the same or
comparable work. 60 Even when compared to other contingent and nonstandard arrangements, workers deployed by temp agencies receive the
lowest rates of pay and benefits coverage. 61 The overall savings to
employers are consequently enormous since the rate at which the temp
agency bills a client firm for its use of a temp is far lower than the user
firm’s total compensation cost for a new hire. 62
The disparities in pay and benefits suffered by temps are commonly
cited. What is often missing from the literature however, are two structural
aspects of the temp agency’s role that are crucial to understanding the
exploitation of temp workers, and pertinent to our analysis and policy
recommendations. The first relates to the role of temp agencies as
gatekeepers to labor markets and the second to their function as contractual
bargaining agents in triangular employment relationships.
As a gatekeeper, the temp agency exercises control over access to
labor markets through two components. The first is contractual: agencies
restrict and condition the transition to the standard, i.e. “permanent”
employment relationships desired by most agency workers through the use
of restrictive covenants contained in their agreements with both workers
and client firms. Most agencies expressly forbid temps from making any
attempt to be hired directly by the client firm. 63 Throughout the industry,
substantial fees (referred to as liquidated damages) are charged to client
firms for the conversion of temps to direct employment with the firm. The
second component is disingenuous marketing and recruitment. Temp
agencies present themselves as attractive points of entry into job markets
that satisfy workers’ desire for upward mobility and solicit workers to join
the ranks of temps with dubious “temp to perm” advertisements, claiming
that temporary employment builds skills and relationships that lead to
permanent, standard jobs. 64 The temp industry has intentionally developed
archives/wkyeng_04212005.pdf>
60. See, e.g. Erickcek et al., supra note 23, at 383, 401 n.6.
61. BENNER ET AL., supra note 3, at 4; STONE, supra note 1, at 69-70.
62. Erickcek et al., supra note 23, at 383, 401 n.6.
63. This practice has led to some states to enact legislation that precludes temp agencies from
making such agreements. Arizona (ARIZ. REV. ST. ANN. § 25-553 (2008)), Florida (FLA. STAT. §
448.24(6) (2008)), Illinois (820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/40 (2008)), and New Mexico (N.M. STAT. § 5015-4(D) (2008)) expressly prohibit such restrictions, long common in the temp industry. Florida, Illinois
and New Mexico do, however, permit a temp agency to collect a placement fee when a worker takes a
direct-hire job with a user firm. FLA. STAT. § 448.24(6); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 175/40; N.M. STAT. §
50-15-4(E).
64. ROGERS, supra note 29, at 67-68.
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a discourse in its recruitment materials – what one researcher labels the
“myth of the full-time job” 65 – that hypes temp work as a bridge to fulltime work while, in fact, it operates as a barrier or, at best, a screen 66 that
functions as an obstacle that prevents or delays temp workers from
transitioning to the standard workforce. 67 More often than not, however,
temps languish in temporary, unbenefited positions for months or, in the
case of “perma-temps,” for years, because no fixed time period or
performance criteria exist to determine when or if a worker will be
converted to “permanent” status. Moreover, many businesses have evolved
a practice (called “try before you buy”) of only hiring direct employees
after they have done a stint of indeterminate duration with a particular temp
agency, 68 or of permanently staffing certain job classifications with
temps. 69 The firm’s human resource office expressly tells applicants to sign
up at the preferred temp agency or “master vendor” if they desire to work
with the business. 70 Increasingly, by virtue of their exclusive contracts with
employers, temp and staffing agencies stand at the gates of particular firms
and labor markets as the only way for workers to enter. Thus sheltered
from pure competition with other agencies, they are able to exercise a great
deal of power over workers in imposing the terms of employment. 71
The dealings and negotiations between temp agencies and client firms
set the collective terms of deployment of the temp workforce to the client
firm. For each job order, agency managers meet or communicate with
representatives of the client firm to share information on current labor costs
and exchange proposals concerning the agency’s billing rates and, either
explicitly or implicitly, the pay rates of the different classes of workers the
65. Id. at 67.
66. See Erickcek et al., supra note 23, at 379-81.
67. See ROGERS, supra note 29, at 67-70.
68. See Jamie Peck & Nikolas Theodore, The Business of Contingent Work: Growth And
Restructuring in Chicago’s Temporary Employment Industry, 12 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 655-74 (1998);
Cynthia M. Ofstead, Temporary Help Firms as Entrepreneurial Actors, 14 SOCIOLOGICAL FORUM 273,
289 (1999); Susan N. Houseman, Arne L. Kalleberg & George A. Erickcek, The Role of Temporary
Help Employment in Tight Labor Markets, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 105,122-24 (2003).
69. Smith et al., supra note 16, at 665-75 (comments of Stephen Strong).
70. See id. at 668-69 (“[t]he employees are called ‘employees’ of Kelly (i.e., Kelly Services), but
they really are not coming from Kelly . . . the employer (client firm) provides the employees to Kelly.
Kelly simply does the service of putting them on Kelly’s payroll.”). See also Danielle van Jaarsveld,
Nascent Organizing Initiatives Among High-Skilled Contingent Workers: The MicrosoftWashtech/CWA Case 128-31, Masters Thesis, Cornell University (2000) (copy on file wth authors).
For further discussion of these types of master vendor agreements, see generally Jan Druker & Celia
Stanworth, Partnerships and the Private Recruitment Industry, 11 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. J. 73, 73-89
(2001).
71. Isabel Fernandez-Mateo, Who Pays the Price of Brokerage? Transferring Constraint through
Price Setting in the Staffing Sector, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 291, 293-96 (2007) (describing the “social
friction” that insulates LMIs from pure competition).
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agency is being requested to provide. In some high volume contracts, other
conditions of employment, such as procedures for handling grievances and
dismissals, are also discussed and decided on. These private “price
negotiations” are concluded so as to maximize “cost savings” to the client
firm and a reasonable operating margin and profits for the agency. 72 The
temp agency does not assume these “costs”; rather, they are passed on to
the workers who are assigned to that client 73 in the form of a lower wage
and reduced or non-existent benefits. 74 Once negotiations with the client
are concluded, the temp agency offers temp workers a pay rate that is a
percentage of the bill rate received from the client. 75 Recent research
confirms that because of their collusive business ties with valued client
firms, staffing agencies are able to transfer to temp workers the cost of
“savings” offered to clients rather than reduce their own margins, 76 and
extract rents above the actual value of their services. 77
The mechanisms of exploitation in the temp agency industry are
intentionally hidden or obfuscated. The “billing process” by which a temp’s
terms and conditions of employment are established is controlled by the
contractual agreement between the agency and the client firm. 78 This
contract, of course, is completely outside the purview of the temp agency’s
workforce. Indeed, this information is protected by the temp industry as
confidential business information. 79 Moreover, temp agencies routinely
prohibit the discussion of pay rates, fail to provide reasons for the
termination of a temp’s assignment, do not provide the client’s evaluation
of a temp’s work performance, and, most importantly, block temp workers’
access to the agency’s mark-up rates and other terms of its contractual
agreements with client firms. 80 When hired, temps typically face a “take it
or leave it” proposition on the question of wages. Even at the high end,
72. Temp industry advertising aimed at business clients candidly explains that the to-beeliminated benefit packages of directly hired employees (health insurance, holiday and sick pay, etc.)
represent “your (the client’s) savings.” Gonos, supra note 48, at 600-02; see also Fernandez-Mateo,
supra note 71, at 298-99. Some employers set their “purchase price” for specific classes of labor which
is then marked down by the agency to arrive at the workers wage. See van Jaarsveld, supra note 10, at
367-70. In other cases a simple “cost-plus” formula is used, as when staffing agencies engaged in
“payrolling” add their standard mark-up to the hourly wage paid at the time of the agreement. See also
BARLEY & KUNDA, supra note 39, at 151-56.
73. Fernandez-Mateo supra note 71, at 293-97, 304-08.
74. Gonos, supra note 48, at 600-02.
75. Fernandez-Mateo, supra note 71, at 299.
76. Id. at 312-15.
77. Id. at 293-97, 312.
78. Id. at 310.
79. Joseph B. Darby, The Untouchable Topic: Agencies Explain Why They Charge Fees and What
Is Reasonable, CONTRACT PROFESSIONAL, July-Aug. 1998, at 37-45.
80. ROGERS, supra note 29, at 120.

FREEMAN AND GONOS

2009]

11/20/2009 11:11:02 AM

TAMING THE EMPLOYMENT SHARKS

117

they very rarely get to negotiate pay rates. 81 Indeed, these dynamics and
problematic conditions cut across income and occupational lines. The temp
work paradigm engenders exploitation in labor markets of skilled
professionals 82 as well as in low-wage, unskilled labor markets where
exploitation may be exacerbated in numerous ways. Among the most
egregious practices is the failure to pay statutory overtime rates. 83 In
manufacturing and construction work it can be compounded by extra
charges for safety equipment, transportation, or check cashing. 84 Thus, for
most temp workers, real bargaining power to affect the wages they are
offered – what the NLRA aptly refers to as the “actual liberty of contract”
of employees 85 – is practically nil. The client firm’s bottom line – what it is
willing to pay the temp agency – effectively dictates the maximum wage
that the agency is willing to pay its temps, since the staffing firm has little
or no ability or inclination to absorb wage increases not backed by the
client firm. 86
In short, there are only nominal market forces to counter the
inexorable drive to lower wages and reduced benefits for workers
employed through the for-profit temp and staffing industry. Without legal
reforms that encourage operational transparency of the temporary staffing
industry and organization to achieve a strong collective voice for temps, it
is difficult to imagine a reversal of the second-class status of workers
employed through for-profit LMIs.
D. Obstacles to a Focused Inquiry on the Legal Status of the Temp Agency
and other For-Profit Labor Market Intermediaries
Stephen Befort has observed that all contingent and nonstandard work
81. Fernandez-Mateo, supra note 71, at 299.
82. These conditions have spurred complaints and concerted activity among high-end temps to
defend work standards and terms of deployment See, e.g., ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY,
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 147-50 (2003) (providing a
socio-legal analysis of Silicon Valley’s labor market where temp agencies are a vital component of the
workforce, deploying between 7 and 10 percent of the workforce); see also ROGERS, supra note 29, at
12, 127-50 (noting that as early as 1995, Forbes magazine reported that Butler International, a “highend” temporary employment business, routinely leased engineers, computer programmers and managers
for six to nine month assignments and that lawyers as well as secretaries are mailroom clerks are now
“for rent” from temp agencies).
83. Author interviews with temps in scientific laboratory work (on file with author).
84. Kerr & Dole, supra note 39, at 87, 93-95.
85. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Staffing agencies also deliberately obstruct workers’ access to
unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation, further reducing their bargaining power and
constraining their freedom of movement.
86. J.G. Axelrod, Who’s the Boss? Employee Leasing and the Joint Employer Relationship, 3
LAB. LAW. 853 (1987); Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relationship, 74 TEXAS L.
REV. 1527 (1996).
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relationships occupy a “black-hole in the legal universe.” 87 The temporary
staffing industry’s deployment of workers to client firms certainly occupies
the center of this “veritable regulation-free zone.” 88 A major determinant of
temp agency workers’ second-class status is the legally invisible system of
contracting practices used by the staffing industry. As discussed above, the
staffing firms and their clients exchange information on labor costs and
operating expenses in order to arrive at billing rates and wage levels that
afford the client firm “cost savings” and the agency its operating margin. 89
In effect, the system of hidden negotiations and “mark-ups” takes what was
formerly part of the employees’ share of total income and literally
redistributes or splits it between the agency and client firm. This
paradigmatic, but barely recognized, wage-setting process by which the
staffing agency and its client profit from temp placement is not a legally
cognizable injury and operates outside the boundaries of employment law.
Absent government regulation, the temp industry’s normative mode of
operation will continue to extract a hidden fee or markup from its
workforce for the “privilege” of being deployed into the labor market.
For a number of reasons, these mediating and job brokering dynamics
have escaped legal scrutiny. First, most critical legal analysis of
nonstandard employment relationships has focused on the exploitation of
temps hired directly by employers, i.e. without a market intermediary.
Nonstandard workers hired directly by employers comprise the majority of
contingent workers. 90 They have their own unique set of issues that arise
from often being legally misclassified as independent contractors and
deprived of the panoply of legal protections that workplace law provides to
employees. 91 Second, the taxonomy of commercial LMIs is complex. 92

87. Befort, supra note 13, at 164-65. Even labor market analysts and human resource scholars
who part ways on the benefits of using temp agencies agree that government regulation is “hopelessly
out of touch” with the changes wrought by the growth of the non-standard workforce. See Charles
Heckscher, HR Strategy and Nonstandard Work: Dualism Versus True Mobility, in NONSTANDARD
WORK, supra note 2, at 267, 267-90.
88. Befort, supra note 13, at 154.
89. See Gonos, supra note 48, at 598.
90. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-76, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE
EDWARD M. KENNEDY AND THE HONORABLE ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, U.S. SENATE: CONTINGENT
WORKERS: INCOMES AND BENEFITS LAG BEHIND THOSE OF THE REST OF THE WORKFORCE 14, tbl. 1
(2000), available at <http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00076.pdf> (reporting the number of agency
temps as 1,188,000 of 39,271,000 contingent workers).
91. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 1, at 279-81; Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent
Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory
Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 187 (1999).
92. See Orly Lobel, The Slipperiness of Stability: Contracting for Flexible and Triangular
Employment Relationships in the New Economy, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 109, 112-15 (2003)
(outlining the problematic configuration of labor markets utilizing commercial LMIs).
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Consider, for instance, that temp agencies often operate in narrow labor
markets deploying only highly paid engineers, professionals, and
managerial staff, while other agencies focus solely on semi-skilled clerical
staff, manual laborers, or welfare-to-work recipients. 93 Consequently, the
shared characteristics that would ground uniform regulation of temp
agencies and other forms of commercial LMIs is not readily apparent.
Third, when the plight of temp agency workers is examined, the focus is
often on establishing the client firm as an employer of the agency worker in
order to bring the temp worker within the zone of legal protections and
rights afforded to the client firm’s standard workforce. 94 These important
efforts to use a joint-employer doctrine and other theories to improve the
conditions of temp workers by arguing that temps have two employers has
met with mixed results in the courts. 95 Moreover, the joint-employer
approach does little to alter or even explain the exploitation that arises from
the temp agency’s mediating and matchmaking role in triangular
employment relationships.
As it stands, the nation’s workplace laws lack a vocabulary that would
permit the temp agency and other commercial LMIs to be considered as
something other than employers, much less capture the exploitive dynamics
of triangular employment relationships. Because the temp agency is only
legally understood to be an employer, its mediating role largely falls
outside the framework of workplace law, and its role as a strategic wedge
in the battle over flexibility and deregulation of the workplace 96 remains
unchallenged. Reconceptualizing a legal framework in which to analyze
and regulate the temporary staffing industry and other commercial LMIs
requires, at least in part, a step “back to the future” to locate a lost legal
vocabulary and understanding of profit-driven LMIs.

93. For example, on the last day of New York Mayor Rudolph Guliani’s administration, 3500
welfare-to-work recipients working at union wages for the New York City Parks Department were
transferred to a temporary staffing agency, taking an immediate pay cut of $1.43 per hour. See Nina
Bernstein, City Fires 3,500 Former Welfare Recipients, N.Y.TIMES, Jan 5, 2002, at B3.
94. E.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997); M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331
N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000), rev’d in part, Oakwood Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. 76 (2004).
95. See discussion infra Part VI; Bita Rahebi, Rethinking the NLRB’s Treatment of Temporary
Workers: Granting Greater Access to Unionization, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1105, 1115-30 (2000)
(examining various theories and outcomes in cases utilizing the joint employer doctrine); see also, e.g.,
Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 280-91 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that constriction on
employer’s ability to control its nurses, who were assigned to work at employer’s hospital-clients, did
not exempt it from overtime pay provisions of FLSA, notwithstanding the nature of its business in
assigning its employees to work elsewhere, which posed practical difficulties in enforcing its formal
rule against unapproved overtime).
96. See Jamie Peck & Nik Theodore, Temped Out? Industry Rhetoric, Labor Regulation, and
Economic Restructuring in the Temporary Staffing Business, 23 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 143
(2002) (applying this analysis to the temp industry’s role in union-avoidance).
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III. LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES DURING THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM
The ills of today’s non-standard employment relationships are not
without historical antecedent. At the turn of the twentieth century,
comparable levels of vulnerability and similar social problems were
experienced by workers who sought jobs through profit-driven employment
agencies. This gave rise to strict and comprehensive (albeit only partially
effective) state regulation of private employment agencies. Nothing
comparable exists today. Efforts to regulate the exploitive practices of the
contemporary commercial staffing industry are only beginning to gain
traction. The next two sections explain the important lessons to be derived
from working class campaigns and legal regulations that attempted to
address the abuses perpetrated by fee-charging employment agencies
during the rise and consolidation of industrial capitalism.
A. Employment Sharks and Padrones: Crudely Connecting Labor and
Capital, 1880-1917
The expansion of industrial capitalism in late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, not unlike the closing decades of the twentieth century,
was characterized by rapid economic transition and high levels of labor
market volatility. 97 All manner of private labor agents flourished in
response to the soaring demand for casual labor created by a booming
industrial economy. 98 The commercial employment agency business, the
parent of the modern temp industry, emerged from the job brokering
practices of “immigrant middlemen” 99 who orchestrated the importation of
foreign contract laborers in the decades following the Civil War. These
immigrant agents, or padrones, received commissions from railroad,
mining, agricultural, and industrial interests to lure contract labor from the
agent’s country of origin – Greece, Italy and other European countries as
well as Mexico and Japan – with the promise of free passage and jobs. 100
Padrones also served as on-the-job overseers that mediated all aspects of
the workers’ lives, creating the circumstances for the most lucrative part of

97. JOSHUA L. ROSENBLOOM, LOOKING FOR WORK, SEARCHING FOR WORKERS: AMERICAN
LABOR MARKETS DURING INDUSTRIALIZATION 74-78 (2002) (summarizing the expansion of public
labor exchanges from 1900 until 1915).
98. See, e.g., WALTER LICHT, GETTING WORK: PHILADELPHIA, 1840-1950, at 123-24 (1992).
99. See generally Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Middleman Minorities, 38 AM. SOC. REV. 583
(1973).
100. See GUNTHER PECK, REINVENTING FREE LABOR: PADRONES AND IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN
THE NORTH AMERICAN WEST, 1880-1930, at 1-4 (2000).
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their business. They overcharged for train fares, rented the shanties in
which the men lived, sold them groceries and supplies, and exacted
additional fees for “services” of all kinds. 101
After 1885, when federal law prohibited the importation of foreign
“contract labor,” 102 large commercial agencies gradually replaced the
padrone at the top of the employment agency business. Immigrant agents
re-focused their recruitment activities on urban centers in the U.S., and the
padrone now became a “middleman” between desperate immigrant
populations and the commercial Anglo-operated employment offices. 103
Around 1890, major urban centers experienced what Frances Kellor
described as a “spasmodic multiplication” of employment agency
activity. 104 Nationwide demand for manual labor – railroad and highway
construction, harvesting, logging, and other basic industries – fueled the
growth of “general” labor agencies, the largest segment of the business. 105
Their prime role was the recruitment of unskilled “day labor,” 106 a huge
mobile segment of the workforce whose jobs were seasonal or irregular as
a result of fluctuations in the economy. Large commercial agencies holding
the major orders, most headquartered in Chicago, were supplied with
workers by smaller, more specialized offices, and by multifarious networks
of individual agents, including immigrant middlemen of various
nationalities and small entrepreneurs doing business from their positions as
local bankers, ticket agents, or saloon keepers. 107 Thus, the “drifting class”
that moved incessantly from job to job depended on this diverse network of
LMIs to obtain work. 108
The employment agency business in all its forms was a crucial part of
101. See id. at 49-81; FRANCES A. KELLOR, OUT OF WORK: A STUDY OF UNEMPLOYMENT, 135-41,
184-93, 393 (revised ed. 1915); DON LESCOHEIR & ELIZABETH BRANDEIS, WORKING CONDITIONS AND
LABOR LEGISLATION, VOL. III: HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932, at 185-87
(1935); DAVID MONTGOMERY, FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR 58-111 (1987).
102. An Act to Prohibit the Importation and Migration of Foreigners and Aliens under Contract or
Agreement to Perform Labor in the United States, its Territories, and the District of Columbia, ch. 164,
23 Stat. 332 (1885) (repealed 1952); see generally Prescott Hall, The Federal Contract Labor Law, 11
HARV. L. REV. 525, 525-27 (1898).
103. See LESCOHEIR & BRANDEIS, supra note 101.
104. KELLOR, supra note 101, at 393; see also TOMÁS MARTINEZ, THE HUMAN MARKETPLACE: AN
EXAMINATION OF PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES 16 (1976).
105. See generally KELLOR, supra note 101, at 157-270 (providing perhaps the best overview of the
diversity of the employment agency business at the turn of the century); see also ROSENBLOOM, supra
note 97, at 64-70.
106. Agency workers were generally not skilled craft workers, who were supplied though unions,
or factory operatives; instead, they were easily recruited at the factory gates or through kinship and
neighborhood networks. See DANIEL NELSON, MANAGERS AND WORKERS: ORIGINS OF THE NEW
FACTORY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1920, at 79-100 (1975).
107. DON D. LESCOHIER, THE LABOR MARKET 146-150, 153-58 (1923).
108. MONTGOMERY, supra note 101, at 87.
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this era’s churning labor market, engaging in a commodity exchange – the
simple sale of labor power – on a vast scale, unrestricted by any
government regulation. Described in today’s terms, industrial capitalism in
the late nineteenth and early-twentieth century America rested on a
flexible, “high-velocity” labor market. 109 At the turn of the twentieth
century, from what information is available, licensed agencies alone must
have handled several million job seekers a year. 110 “Inadequate as these
figures are,” stated one economist at the turn of the twentieth century, “they
yet serve in some degree to [. . .] give an idea of the vast sums that are paid
annually [in fees to employment agencies] by the unemployed for the
purpose of securing employment.” 111 A federal commission estimated that
by 1914, between 3,000 and 5,000 private fee-charging agencies were
operating nationally. 112
B. Responses to Exploitation: Labor Organizing and States’ Efforts to
Regulate For-Profit Employment Agencies in the Shadow of Freedom of
Contract
From the late nineteenth century until World War II, worker protests
and a constant stream of public criticism targeted widespread abuses
perpetrated by fee-charging private employment agencies. At one point, as
labor radicals organized against employment agents and successive waves
of federal and state public hearings issued scathing reports excoriating the
private employment agencies, public condemnation of the industry called
into question the right of employment agencies to operate. During this time,
state legislation regulating fee-charging employment agencies proliferated
and three Supreme Court cases addressed the question of whether it was
proper for the states to regulate profit-driven employment agencies.
1. Don’t Buy Jobs! – The Wobblies Take on the Employment Sharks
In the early 1900s important labor struggles were aimed at ending the
employment agencies’ exploitation of temporary and seasonal workers and
its lock on entry to important labor markets. Consider, for example, a 1909
109. See ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A
HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET xv-xxi (2003) (describing the high-velocity labor market of
California’s Silicon Valley at the turn of the twenty-first century).
110. E.L. Bogart, Public Employment Offices in the United States and Germany, 14 Q.J. ECON.
341, 344-45 (1900).
111. Id. at 345.
112. U.S. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT AND
TESTIMONY, SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS BY THE COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CREATED BY
THE ACT OF AUGUST 23, 1912, at 109 (1916).
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campaign against the employment agencies led by the Industrial Workers
of the World (IWW) in Spokane, Washington, the largest western center of
migratory labor. 113 At that time, a booming business in logging, railroads
and construction was run on temporary labor deployed by Spokane’s
private employment agents. 114 Congregating outside employment agency
offices, organizers mounted soapboxes calling for a boycott of the agencies
derisively branded by the wobbly organizers as “employment sharks.” 115
Incensed at being fleeced by private agencies, this agitation resonated
among the workers, commonly called “floaters.” 116 A central demand of
these workers was the abolition of fee-charging by employment agents and
the establishment of free public or union-operated employment offices. 117
In response, the employment agents formed the Associated Agencies
of Spokane and persuaded the municipal council to ban “streetspeaking.” 118 This sparked a legendary IWW free speech fight. “Wobblies”
descended on Spokane and immediately defied the ban on labor
soapboxing. Campaigning under the slogan “Don’t Buy Jobs,” the IWW
led street protests against the “labor sharks” with the aim of extinguishing
the “vermin.” 119 Police arrests of more than 600 protesters only fueled the
struggle. The prisoners organized and carried out a hunger strike while
citizens, the American Federation of Labor and the Socialist Party joined
the protest. The authorities surrendered. The ordinance was rescinded,
prisoners released, and the right of the workers to rent halls and engage in
labor agitation on the streets was established. On top of that, the local
authorities revoked the licenses of nineteen hated employment agencies. 120
2. Progressive Reformers’ Fight to Regulate Exploitive Employment
Agents
Labor protests provided the backdrop for an investigation of the
abusive practices of employment agency industry by the U.S. Commission
on Industrial Relations (CIR). 121 From 1912 until 1915, the CIR held
113. PHILIP FONER, 4 HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 177-85 (1965).
114. Id. at 177-78.
115. Id. at 178.
116. Id. at 177, 179-82.
117. Id. at 178, 182-83.
118. Id. at 178-79.
119. Id.; SELIG PERLMAN & PHILIP TAFT, 4 HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 18961932: LABOR MOVEMENTS 236-37 (1935); see also FELLOW WORKERS AND FRIENDS: IWW FREE
SPEECH FIGHTS AS TOLD BY PARTICIPANTS 30-31 (Philip S. Foner, ed., 1981).
120. FONER, supra note 113, at 178-83; see FELLOW WORKERS AND FRIENDS, supra note 119, at
32-34.
121. U.S. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 112, at 29.
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hearings on unemployment and temporary work in twelve industrial
centers. Across the nation, 122 sheaves of testimony by workers catalogued
the standard industry abuses: excessive fees, collusion with employers and
various forms of extortion and misrepresentation. Fee-charging practices of
employment agencies, in particular, became a widely recognized “social
evil” in early twentieth century labor markets. 123 Private agents earned the
label of “employment sharks” by charging exorbitant fees and sending
workers to non-existent jobs. Employment agencies and employers
colluded in “fee-splitting,” bilking workers by intentionally promoting high
turnover, hiring and quickly dismissing workers to maximize the number of
fees collected. 124 The CIR concluded that the private employment agency
business “as a whole reeks with fraud, extortion, and flagrant abuses of
every kind.” 125
Legislative efforts to curtail abusive practices by the employment
agencies proceeded along two paths – a more radical approach which
sought to abolish fee-charging employment agencies and a reformist effort
to strictly regulate the employment agency business. The IWW-led
Spokane campaign spearheaded the abolitionist approach. 126 Reports
122. Between 1887 and 1914, no fewer than eleven states held hearings and issued scathing reports
excoriating the private employment agency business. UDO SAUTTER, THREE CHEERS FOR THE
UNEMPLOYED: GOVERNMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 56-57 (1992).
123. See generally Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 359-75 (1928) (Stone, J. dissenting); Adams
v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 597-611(1917) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
124. As fee-splitting was explained by the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations in 1915:
The foreman agrees to hire men of a certain employment agent on condition that oneforth or one-half of every fee collected from men whom he hires be given to him. This
leads the foreman to discharge men constantly in order to have more men hired through
the agent and more fees collected.
BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., GROWTH OF LABOR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
140 (1962).
125. Quoted in WILLIAM J. BREEN, LABOR MARKET POLITICS AND THE GREAT WAR: THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE STATES, AND THE FIRST U.S. EMPLOYMENT SERVICE, 1907-1933, at 18384 (1997). Even the nation’s first Secretary of Labor, William B. Wilson, noted “a tendency toward
dishonesty in connection with the very nature of the business itself.” Id. at 144. The CIR’s final report
recommended a national labor distribution system for migrant workers, free transportation for those
who secured employment through public employment agencies, and federal licensing and regulation of
private agencies. CINDY HAHAMOVICH, THE FRUITS OF THEIR LABOR: ATLANTIC COAST
FARMWORKERS AND THE MAKING OF MIGRANT POVERTY, 1870-1945, at 75-76 (1997).
126. By the turn of the twentieth century, attempts to abolish private agencies through law were
also made in Idaho and “stringent regulatory law” was adopted in Wisconsin (right to refuse a license
when agency deemed to be unnecessary in a given city) and Minnesota (damages in cases of fraud,
municipal licensing fee of $100 and posting of $10,000 bond). LESCHOHEIR & BRANDEIS, supra note
101, at 186. The anti-employment agency sentiment was echoed in global forums. The International
Labour Organization adopted a “recommendation” in 1919 “to prohibit the establishment of
employment agencies which charge fees,” by which time several nations, e.g., France, the Netherlands
and Canada, had already resolved to abolish private agencies. See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B.
ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 8, 11, 21 (4th revised ed. Augustus M. Kelley 1967)
(1916).
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produced by the Washington State Department of Labor, based on workers’
testimony, pointedly criticized employment agencies for charging
excessive fees, fee-splitting, and other fraudulent and abusive conduct. In
1913-14, a widespread perception that private fee-charging agencies
exacerbated rising unemployment led Washington citizens to pass a
referendum, the “Abolishing Employment Agency Measure,” outlawing the
collection of employment agency fees from workers. 127 The Measure still
allowed agents to collect fees from business clients, but it was widely
believed that the Measure would put commercial agents out of business
because the prevailing business model was for employment agents to
collect “registration fees” from workers “up front” at the time of their
application for work. Like other opponents of private agencies across the
country, promoters of the initiative favored a free public system of labor
exchange, a project already underway in Washington. 128
The right of states to use their police powers to regulate for-profit
employment agencies was sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1916. 129 However, one year later and three years after the Washington state
measure was adopted, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Adams v. Tanner, 130
struck down the law. Applying the Court’s notorious liberty of contract
doctrine, 131 Adams held that the Washington ballot referendum
unconstitutionally trampled the agencies’ Fourteenth Amendment right to
engage in business and freely contract with those who chose to use the
agent’s services. A five-justice majority reasoned that since “appellants’
occupation as agents for workers could not exist unless the latter pay for
what they receive,” the Washington statute was “one of prohibition, not
regulation.” 132 Justice Louis Brandeis’s vigorously dissented, presenting
detailed studies and statistics to demonstrate that the evils of fee-charging

127. The referendum stated that
the system of collecting fees from the workers for furnishing them with employment, or
with information leading thereto, results frequently in their becoming the victims of
imposition and extortion and is therefore detrimental to the welfare of the state . . . It
shall be unlawful for any employment agent, his representative, or any other person to
demand or receive either directly or indirectly from any person seeking employment, or
from any person on his or her behalf, any remuneration or fee whatsoever for furnishing
him or her with employment or with information leading thereto.
Quoted in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 591 (1917).
128. Adams, 244 U.S. at 614; LESCOHIER, supra note 107, at 164-76; LESCOHIER & BRANDEIS,
supra note 101, at 192-197; see William M. Leiserson, The Theory of Public Employment Offices and
the Principles of Their Practical Administration, 29 POL. SCI. Q. 28, 36-46 (1914) (describing
Wisconsin’s public system).
129. Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916)
130. 244 U.S. at 586-97.
131. See Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
132. Adams, 244 U.S. at 593.
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agencies were “inherent and ineradicable.” 133 He concluded that
Washington voters could constitutionally outlaw fee-charging even if the
law did force private employment agencies out of business, since
prohibition of a business was not outside the scope of state power when the
targeted evil could not be otherwise prevented. Justice Brandeis’s opinion
echoed the widely held view that the very notion of a worker having to buy
a job was “foreign to the spirit of American freedom and opportunity.” 134
Adams’ application of Lochner-era freedom of contract doctrine
circumscribed the arena of employment agency regulation for more than
three decades. But Adams did not prevent states from imposing fee ceilings
on employment agency rate schedules, as Brazee v. Michigan squarely held
that employment agencies were subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the states. 135 So even after Adams, the American Association
for Labor Legislation (AALL), the standard bearer of the Progressive
movement’s effort to eliminate the more savage features of the labor
market, continued to call for strict state regulation of private employment
agencies. 136 The AALL’s call for strict regulation of private agencies was
coupled with reform proposals to develop and expand a free, efficient
system of public employment offices that would in short order drive out the
dishonest private operators. 137 Public disdain for the exploitive character of
the private employment agency remained part of the dialogue about the ills
of unregulated industrial capitalism during the first three decades of the
twentieth century. 138
133. Id. at 606.
134. Adams, 244 U.S. at 602-03 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. COMMISSION ON
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 112).
135. 241 U.S. 340, 343 (1916) (“The general nature of the [employment agency] business is such
that unless regulated many persons may be exposed to misfortunes . . .”).
136. See, e.g., John B. Andrews, Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Must Be Effectively
Regulated, 19 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 367, 367-70 (1929); George H. Trafton, Employment Agencies
Officially Exposed: Sworn Testimony Shows Urgent Need of State Action, 20 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 27,
27-36 (1930).
137. The movement for free, state-wide public employment offices began in Ohio in 1890. By
World War I, nearly 100 municipal and state-run public agencies were operating in twenty-six states.
See BREEN, supra note 125; KELLOR supra note 101, at 299-353; LESCOHIER & BRANDEIS, supra note
101, at 192-209; PAUL T. RINGENBACH, TRAMPS AND REFORMERS 1873-1916: THE DISCOVERY OF
UNEMPLOYMENT IN NEW YORK 48-52 (1973); ROSENBLOOM, supra note 94, at 74-78 (summarizing
expansion of public labor exchanges from 1900 until 1915); Bogart, supra note 110, at 341-66;
Leiserson, supra note 128; Udo Sautter, North American Government Labor Agencies Before World
War One: A Cure for Unemployment?, 24 LAB. HISTORY 366, 366-67 (1983).
138. Ribnick v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 363-65 (1928) (Stone, J., dissenting) (reiterating that the
findings of “thirty years . . . of repeated investigations, official and unofficial, and of extensive public
comment, afford a substantial basis for the conclusion . . . that the business is peculiarly subject to
abuses related to fee-charging.”); see also George Gonos, “Never a Fee!: The Miracle of the
Postmodern Temporary Help and Staffing Agency, 4 WORKING USA: J. LAB. & SOC’Y, Dec. 2000, at 9,
19 .
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By 1914, at least twenty-five states had some form of regulation on
the books (though a third of these laws were considered inadequate). 139 By
1928, Progressives had enacted and strengthened legislation in thirty-nine
states regulating the private employment agency. 140 Most statutes contained
detailed provisions governing the fee agencies charged workers in order to
address the “the very fact [that] fee-charging carries with it a dangerous
temptation to abuse and fraud.” 141 The express goal was to make the fee
charged to the worker – no matter what its form – transparent and subject
to reasonable limits as a means of limiting the rate of exploitation of those
who pay another for access to the labor market because, “the agencies, left
to themselves, very generally charge extortionate fees.” 142 Hence, laws
either placed ceilings on fees or required that fee schedules be posted or
filed with the state. 143 Most of these states outlawed collusive fee-splitting,
the practice used by agencies and employers to share in the fees charged to
workers. 144 Agencies were required to keep records, open to inspection, of
all placements made and fees charged, and receipts had to be provided to
workers. 145 Many state laws mandated refunds of fees (registration fees and
transportation costs could also be recovered) when jobs were not obtained
or turned out to be of an unusually short duration. 146 Demanding extra
charges for “favors”, i.e., charging fees for any service other than for
furnishing employment, was made illegal. 147
Employment agency statutes provided an expansive definition of the
fee the agencies charged workers, and considered all forms of employment
agency activity 148 subject to fee ceilings. The New Jersey statute enacted in
139. Leiserson, supra note 128.
140. Ribnick, 277 U.S. at 370, n.13 (Stone, J., dissenting); KELLOR, supra note 101, at 354
(providing summaries of state laws governing employments agencies in the early twentieth century);
Andrews, supra note 136, at 367-70.
141. Ribnick, 277 U.S. at 364, n.1 (Stone, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 365.
143. As of 1928, twenty-one states limited the total fees charged by employment agencies. Ribnik,
277 U.S. at 371-72 & nn.13-18 (Stone, J., dissenting); see also DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S.
DEP’T OF LAB., BULLETIN NO. 57, PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES: LAWS RELATING TO THEIR
REGULATION – AS OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1943 (1943).
144. See KELLOR, OUT OF WORK, supra note 101, at 366 (as early as 1904, the time of publication
of the first edition of this book, ten states had outlawed fee-splitting.)
145. Ribnik, 277 U.S. at 371-72; DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 143.
146. DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 143, at 12.
147. See, e.g., id. at 109 (New Jersey limited charges to those authorized by permitted fee
schedule).
148. For example,
[t]he term “employment agency” . . . shall mean and include the business of procuring or
offering to procure help or employment . . . whether such business is conducted in a
building or on the street or elsewhere . . . where a fee or privilege or commission is
exacted, charged or received directly or indirectly for procuring or assisting or promising
to procure employment . . . of any kind . . .”
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1918 covered fees received by an agency “directly or indirectly . . . whether
such is collected from the applicant for employment or the applicant for
help.” 149 The statute defined a “fee” as
any payment of money, or the promise to pay money, or the excess of
money received by any person furnishing employment or employees
over what he has paid for transportation, transfer or [sic] baggage or
lodging for any applicant for employment; it shall also mean and include
the difference between the amount of money received by any person who
furnishes employees . . . and the amount paid by him to said employees .
. . . 150

A longstanding Massachusetts statute provided than an agency “shall
not receive or accept any money from a person seeking employment
through the agency of such office unless employment of the kind demanded
is furnished.” 151 In essence, the legal definition of the agency fee
comported with the economic reality of how a certain segment of the
employment agency business made a profit. For agents that collected
money from employers and paid wages out of that amount to workers, the
fee constituted a “mark-up,” i.e., the difference between the amount the
wholesale labor broker charges the employer for each worker and the
amount the agency pays the worker. 152 Early statutory definitions of feecharging drew no distinction between fees charged for so-called
“permanent” placements and temporary placements. 153
Other provisions of state laws regulating fee-charging employment
agencies typically set licensing fees and criminalized the operation of
employment services without a license. 154 The statutes required proof that
agency operators were of “good moral character,” and required bonding
sufficient for applicants to recover for loss or damage arising from
violations. 155 Sixteen different types of fraudulent employment agency
practices were identified and banned. These included the use of misleading
advertising, 156 sending applicants to non-existent jobs, 157 operating an

1918 N.J. Laws 823.
149. Id.
150. 1918 N.J. Laws 822-23.
151. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 43 (1921). For the text of the 1921 code, see http://
www.archive. org/stream/tercentenaryedit02mass#page/1719/mode/1up.
152. See Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1928).
153. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140 §§ 41, 43, 44 (1921) (making no distinction in the type of
employment concerned, but providing for a refund if the employment is not what was promised and a
partial refund if the employment is terminated within ten days).
154. DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 143, at 14-15.
155. Id. at 15.
156. Id.at 328 (e.g. REV. CODE MONTANA ch. 191, §4171 (1935)).
157. Id. at 355 (e.g. N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 189 (McKinney 1930)).
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agency in conjunction with a lodging place, restaurant, or saloon, 158
referring women or children for immoral employment, 159 inducing persons
to quit a job, and holding an employee’s baggage until fees were paid. 160
Statutory provisions also required that workers be informed of labor
disputes so as to allow them to avoid functioning as strikebreakers. 161 In
sum, the laws were extensive and provided remedies for victims and
criminal penalties for agents that violated the law.
Employer associations and the private employment agency business
fought these reforms, weakening and fragmenting the regulatory
environment. State enforcement of employment agency laws and efforts to
establish alternative, local public employment offices were undermined by
pro-employer groups that made sure these state regulatory activities were
underfunded. Moreover, absent a federal law regulating private agencies
(and a federally coordinated system of labor exchanges), the highly mobile,
interstate character of the labor market made any real reform of the private
employment agency business unlikely. 162 Consequently, the private
employment agency business thrived even as public outrage over rampant
abuses continued to fuel calls for stricter regulation. Through the 1920s,
private, fee-collecting employment agencies were pervasive in the
chronically disorganized urban labor markets of America. 163 Nevertheless,
during this era, there was widespread support for Justice Brandeis’ claim
that, the very notion of a worker having to buy a job was “foreign to the
spirit of American freedom and opportunity.” 164
Ultimately, substantive due process doctrine undermined even the
states’ regulatory efforts to curtail fee-charging, the most problematic
feature of the employment agencies. In 1928, the U.S. Supreme Court held
158. Id.at 234 (e.g. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, § 87 (1935)).
159. Id. at 108 (e.g. 1918 N.J. Laws 830)
160. Id.
161. Id. at 255 (e.g. 1927 Ind. Acts ch. 25, § 12 (currently codified at IND. CODE 25-16-1-2
(2008))).
162. Political pressure brought by the employment agency trade associations and the National
Association of Manufacturers would delay for twenty years the establishment of a federally sponsored
employment service. When a federal employment service was finally established by the Wagner-Peyser
Act in 1933, the same interests would work to keep it a weak competitor of private agencies and shape
it according to their own needs. Significantly, however, the Wagner-Peyser Act establishing the USES
prohibited the referral of job applicants to private fee-charging agencies, a ban that was only removed in
the 1980s by the Job Partnership Training Act. See Gonos, supra note 48, at 598 & n.61.
163. IRVING BERNSTEIN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-1933-THE LEAN YEARS
239 (1960). New York City was serviced by more than one thousand agencies, Chicago over three
hundred. Bernstein summarized their modus operandi as follows: “Frequently run by crooks” the forprofit employment agency was “distinguished by extortionate fees, kickbacks to foreman, inducement
of discharges to increase business, white slavery, and blacklisting of union members.” Id.
164. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 604 (1917) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (quoting U.S.
COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 112).
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in Ribnik v. McBride 165 that New Jersey’s law placing ceilings on agency
fees was unconstitutional price fixing in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause. 166 Reversing its holding in Brazee v.
Michigan, the Court outlawed the statutory ceilings on agency fees then in
place in twenty-nine states. 167 Although forced to shift their strategy
following Ribnik, reformers remained focused on the evils of agencies
charging workers fees to gain access to the labor market. States continued
to license employment agencies and required private agents to post their fee
schedules in a “conspicuous place” in their offices and/or file them with the
appropriate state labor agency. 168 Similarly, Ribnik’s limitations did not
stop state labor departments 169 and the U.S. Congress 170 from investigating
and exposing widely prevalent abuses of workers by private employment
agents prior to World War II.
IV. THE REGULATION OF LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES: FROM THE
NEW DEAL TO THE INDUSTRIAL PLURALIST ERA
Ultimately, it was the consolidation of Fordism, with its increased
reliance on internal labor markets and personnel departments on the one
hand, and the rise of industrial unionism, on the other, that signaled a
reversal of fortune of the for-profit employment agency business. By the
eve of the Second World War, the profit-driven employment agency was
being challenged by the growing presence of the union hiring hall model,
165. 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
166. Id. at 363-65.
167. Id. at 371-72.
168. Andrews, supra note 136, at 399-403; Herman Oliphant, A Decision in the Light of Fact, 19
AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 95, 95-96 (1929).
169. The New York State Industrial Commission held widely publicized hearings in 1929 and
found approximately 1200 private agencies operating in New York City, making an estimated two
million placements yearly. The Commission concluded that the system of municipal regulation of
private employment agencies then in effect was woefully inadequate. Official Commission Reveals
Unemployment Agency Abuses, Recommends Strict Control by New Legislation, 19 AM. LAB. LEGIS.
REV. 270, 270-72 (1929); Frances Perkins, State Regulation of Private Employment Agencies, 20 AM.
LAB. LEGIS. REV. 301, 301-03 (1930); Henry D. Sayer, State Control of Job Agencies 20 AM. LAB.
LEGIS. REV. 369, 369-71 (1930); Trafton, supra note 136, at 27-36; George H. Trafton, New York Fails
to Act, 20 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 138, 138-39 (1930).
170. At the conclusion of its 1929 hearings on the causes of unemployment, the U.S. Senate
Committee on Education and Labor condemned the practices of profit-driven private employment
agencies and called for a system of public employment exchanges to eliminate petty graft and
exploitation of vulnerable workers. The Senate Committee Report stated that the
burden of assisting the unemployed to find work should be borne by organized society
through the maintenance of efficient public employment exchanges [which] should
replace private exchanges. Private employment exchanges which operate for profit and
solely for profit, present a situation where there are conditions conducive to petty graft.
Such practice at the expense of the unemployed is a crime which should not be tolerated.
Andrews, supra note 136, at 367-70 (emphasis added).
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an alternative labor market intermediary that was gaining ground in skilled
and unskilled labor markets characterized by short-term employment and
high mobility. The union-initiated hiring hall utilized hiring practices and
fostered employment outcomes that were correctives to those used by the
employment agency business (i.e., fair procedures for assigning work,
institutionalized training (apprenticeship) programs and job ladders).
Further, the hiring hall ended the agents’ collusion with employers and
represented workers’ interests in negotiating the terms of employment. In a
few short decades, the union hiring hall became the dominant intermediary
on the waterfront and in the construction, warehousing and entertainment
industries; the private employment agency was reduced to a minor actor in
the labor market, limited primarily to deploying surplus employees to
clerical and other “white collar” office jobs. 171 This section explores this
important shift in the functioning of LMIs and the rise of regulatory
regimes that came to govern both commercial and union-sponsored LMIs.
A. State Regulation of the Employment Agents
The “turbulent years” 172 at the start of the New Deal era created an
inhospitable political and economic climate for the employment agency
industry. First, a massive working class upsurge, culminating in the
formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1935, gave
voice and power to the unskilled industrial working class. In less than a
decade, unions tripled their membership, establishing a wide and deep
beachhead in the manufacturing sector where a third of the non-agricultural
workforce was employed. 173 Second, Fordist mass production techniques
led many large industrial employers to expand internal job markets,
providing a large segment of the workforce with long-term job security,
explicit and implicit contractual offers of competitive wages, opportunities
for advancement (job ladders), health and pension benefits, and vacation
schedules. 174 This, in turn, provided employers with a cost-effective
strategy to maintain a long- term, loyal workforce, often trained in firm171. By 1958, the 3900 employment agencies reported to the Census of Business reported
significant shifts in fee-charging employment practices. Notably, 90 percent of placements were now
made in white collar occupations and only 10 percent in blue-collar, reversing the proportions
prevailing at the turn of the twentieth century. Leonard P. Adams, Private Employment Agencies, in
READINGS ON PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICES: COMPILED FOR THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON
LABOR, H. COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 742 (1965). Here we exclude
the continued, widespread presence of private labor contractors in the agricultural sector.
172. See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 163, at 768-95.
173. Id. at 769 (documenting that union membership rose from 2,805,000 in 1933 to 8,410,000 in
1941, encompassing 23 percent of the non-agricultural workforce).
174. STONE supra note 1, at 53-55, 57-58.
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specific skill sets. 175 Third, New Deal labor relations policies, workplace
laws and a growing wartime economic expansion radically expanded
employment opportunities for armies of unskilled workers, 176 large
numbers of whom had previously entered the job market through
employment agents.
The U.S. Department of Labor had begun close monitoring of the
states’ regulation of private employment agencies and issued two special
bulletins on the subject in 1933 and 1937. 177 With the urging of Secretary
of Labor Frances Perkins, delegates to the 1935 National Conference on
Labor Legislation backed passage of federal legislation to regulate
employment agencies. Following President Roosevelt’s appointment of an
interdepartmental committee to study the problem, the Department of
Labor drafted a federal bill to control the activities of employment agents
carrying on interstate business. 178 This bill identified the need to regulate
the huge interstate component of the employment agency business, whose
workers were in a “no-man’s land as far as being protected by any of the
existing private employment agency laws.” 179 In 1940, a House Select
Committee held hearings documenting the “vicious practices” of
employment agents. Its report painted “a distressing picture of fraud and
abuse in the recruitment of labor by numerous unscrupulous private
employment agencies and labor contractors.” 180 Out of these efforts came
the “Employment Agency Act of 1941,” which proposed the U.S.
Department of Labor register all employment agents operating on an
interstate basis and contained a number of regulatory provisions modeled
after the various state laws then in place. 181
175. Id.
176. See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 54-59
(2002).
177. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULLETIN NO. 581, LAWS RELATING
TO EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES AS OF JANUARY 1, 1933 (1933); BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULLETIN NO. 630, LAWS RELATING TO EMPLOYMENT
AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES AS OF JULY 1, 1937 (1937).
178. See PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES, supra note 143, at 16.
179. Id. at 17.
180. To Regulate Private Employment Agencies Engaged in Interstate Commerce: Hearings Before
a Subcommittee of the H. Committee on Labor on H.R.5510 A Bill to Regulate Private Employment
Agencies Engaged in Interstate Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1941).
181. H.R. 5510, 77th Cong. (1941), required agents to file fee schedules and allowed the DOL to
rule on their reasonableness; to keep records of fees received; and to provide employers’ association
information on any extent to which the agency was controlled by an employer or employers association.
Its list of prohibitions reflected the state laws, and included providing fraudulent or misleading
information, sending workers to any place where a strike or lock out existed without providing a written
statement of such, fee splitting, and charges for anything other than job placement, and the operation of
agencies in conjunction with other businesses (lodging houses, labor camps, liquor sales). The bill
provided for fines of up to $5000 and one year imprisonment for each offense, and the appeal of DOL
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That same year, as the nation geared up for war, the U.S. Supreme
Court reentered the national debate on the employment agency issue by
resuscitating the right of states to regulate private fee-charging by
employment agencies in Olsen v. Nebraska. 182 Reversing its 1928 holding
in Ribnik, 183 the Court held that Nebraska’s regulation of the employment
agency’s most exploitive feature, the fee charged to a worker for job
placement, 184 was a constitutionally permissible exercise of state power. In
Olson, the Court rejected the argument presented by the employment
agency: that regulation was no longer warranted because employment
agency abuses were effectively being curbed by competing social forces in
the labor market, i.e., “the increasing competition of public employment
agencies and of charit[ies], labor union[s] and employer association[s].” 185
Whether disingenuous or not, the employment agency’s legal argument in
Olson conveyed the fact that a host of factors were working in combination
to deprive the beleaguered employment agency business of its socioeconomic role in the labor market. The military draft and industrial
mobilization for the war effort ushered in a full-employment economy in
which the federalized, state-run employment service served as the primary
job matching service for workers in mainstream labor markets oriented to
the war-driven economy. 186 Moreover, deployment of labor through forprofit employment agencies produced high-job turnover, low-morale, and
did not allow for skill training or employee loyalty to the business
enterprise – practices that were increasingly at odds with employer interests
and the demands of organized labor. These factors, and the fact that the
Olsen ruling allowed the states to again strictly regulate employment
rulings directly to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Aimed primarily at low-wage, unskilled bluecollar labor, the bill exempted from coverage employment agencies for those working in a professional
or commercial capacity.
182. 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941).
183. 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
184. Among the detailed, stringent provisions of the statute at issue in Olsen, NEB. COMP. STAT. §
48-508 (1929), were the requirements that the registration fee an agency charged be limited to two
dollars and in no case exceed ten percent “of all moneys paid to or to be paid or earned by said
applicant for the first month’s service growing out of said employment furnished by said employer.”
Olsen, 313 U.S. at 246 n.1 (citations omitted). Justice Douglas offered a terse assessment of the
employment agency’s effort to cloak its fee charging practices in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment explaining that
the only constitutional prohibitions or restraints which respondents have suggested for
the invalidation of this legislation are those notions of public policy embedded in earlier
decisions of this Court but which, as Mr. Justice Holmes long admonished, should not be
read into the Constitution.
Id. at 246-47.
185. Olsen, 313 U.S. at 246.
186. See WILLIAM HABER & DANIEL H. KRUGER, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES EMPLOYMENT
SERVICE IN A CHANGING ECONOMY 31-33 (1964).
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agencies, were pushing the profit-driven employment agency to the
economic margins.
Unfortunately, efforts to pass Secretary Perkins’ federal bill regulating
the employment agency industry was overtaken by the nation’s focus on
the war effort and accompanying tumultuous shifts in the U.S. economy
and labor markets. Despite Congressional hearings where forceful
testimony favored passage of the Perkins bill and support from the Eighth
National Conference on Labor Legislation, Congress abandoned Frances
Perkins’ initiative to federally regulate the employment agency industry –
the zenith of federal legislative initiatives in this area. 187 The bill’s
introduction just a few short weeks before Japan bombed Pearl Harbor
meant there would be no vote on the bill. This failure of federal action,
along with the serious problems internal to the public employment service
and continued opposition to regulation from private agencies, 188 would
give the temporary help industry an opening for a revival of the private
employment agency business in a new guise when the war effort ended.
B. The Rise and Operation of the Union Hiring Hall as a Labor Market
Intermediary
The decline of the employment agency industry did not eliminate the
need for LMIs in the middle decades of the twentieth century. During that
time, the union hiring hall assumed the role of gatekeeper to certain labor
markets, exclusively controlling access to certain seasonal labor markets or
to jobs that were either intermittent or of relatively short duration through a
contractual arrangement with an employer or group of employers. 189 Union
hiring halls establish employee referral systems by maintaining lists of
qualified, available workers from which the employer fulfills its hiring
needs. 190 In this regard, the market function of the hiring hall is akin to that
of profit driven LMIs. However, the union hiring hall is in other respects
the antithesis and nemesis of for-profit LMIs. Hiring halls in some
industries arose out of the struggles of common laborers and skilled
187. Nevertheless, as late as 1960, concerns over excessive fees charged by private employment
agencies continued to be expressed by the U.S. Department of Labor and led to the DOL recommending
that there be maximum fees for agencies placing workers in “both temporary and permanent jobs.”
BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULLETIN NO. 209, STATE LAWS REGULATING
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES 11-17 (1960); see Gonos, supra note 48, at 592.
188. DESMOND KING, ACTIVELY SEEKING WORK?: THE POLITICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND
WELFARE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 65-111 (1995).
189. See, e.g., Emily C. Chi, Star Quality and Job Security: The Role of the Performers’ Unions in
Controlling Access to the Acting Profession, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 52 (2000) (gathering
sources and defining and explaining the operation of union hiring halls).
190. Id.
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craftsmen who sought to wrest control of access to casual and intermittent
labor markets away from exploitive employers and profit-driven
employment agents. 191 Over time, union operated hiring halls crafted
collective bargaining agreements that gave labor organizations a high
degree of control over access to the relevant labor market. An orderly
system of job placement based on a seniority system and training
requirements govern the dispatching of workers to jobs and give workers a
bargained for level of control over the terms and conditions of
employment. Despite intermittent or seasonal jobs and changing
employers, hiring halls provided portable benefits and pensions to users of
the hall. In sum, the hiring hall model successfully combated the range of
social ills currently associated with nonstandard and/or contingent work in
a range of industries and occupations employing highly skilled workers as
well as unskilled laborers. These points may be illustrated through a brief
summary of the development and operation of the union hiring halls in the
maritime, food services, entertainment and construction industries.
1. The Docks
Work on the docks of America’s port cities offer a prime example of
the chaotic and exploitive conditions of casual day labor in the first half of
the twentieth century. Here workers finally mounted a successful challenge
the long vilified “shape-up.” As early as 1916, a Washington State Bureau
of Labor’s report stated that the longshoremen “do not take kindly to the
‘line-up’ method of selecting crews which is in vogue” 192 on the waterfront
where virtually all hiring was casual and highly seasonal. 193 During the
1930s in New York, then the nation’s largest port, as many as forty-five
thousand workers sought work under the shape-up system of hiring. Under
the shape system, the employer enjoyed absolute control over hiring on a
daily basis. 194 Thousands of workers could descend on a busy New York
pier head on any given day, seeking work assignments from the hiring
191. See, e.g., DAVID WELLMAN, THE UNION MAKES US STRONG: RADICAL UNIONISM ON THE SAN
FRANCISCO WATERFRONT 58-60 (1995). Wellman describes the shape-up:
Hiring was done at an early morning ‘shape-up,’ or ‘shape’ held in front of piers . . .
Since anyone desiring work could join the shape, and because unemployment was
normally very high, the hire was riddled with bribes, kickbacks, favoritism and
discrimination . . . By the early 1930s it had created a dangerous and brutal speed-up.
Those who resisted were ether fired or blackballed, and replaced with a casual hired
form among the unemployed who lingered around the pierheads . . . .
Id. at 60.
192. CHARLES P. LARROWE, SHAPE-UP AND HIRING HALL: A COMPARISON OF HIRING METHODS
AND LABOR RELATIONS ON THE NEW YORK AND SEATTLE WATERFRONTS 89 (1955).
193. Id. at 97
194. Id. at 92.
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bosses who routinely refrained from rehiring the same workers every day to
make sure that the labor supply each day exceeded the available work of
unloading and loading vessels. 195 Blacklisting, kickbacks to the hiring
agents, and the inevitable injustices resulting from the daily competition
among laborers for access to work characterized the degradation workers
experienced in this labor market. 196
Dockworkers’ demand for an end to the shape-up drove labor
struggles on West Coast ports for almost twenty years. 197 By mid-century,
labor struggles and legislation established union hiring halls in the port
cities of New York, Buffalo, and New Orleans, 198 bringing a large measure
of job stability, a living wage, and benefits to dockworkers and other
maritime workers who had previously been considered the consummate
casual laborers in industrial America.
Charles Larrowe described the operation of the Seattle ILWU hiring
hall in the mid-twentieth century as a “rational solution . . . to the complex
problems of a casual labor market,” coupled with a “foolproof system
which has been devised to prevent abuses in the dispatching process.” 199
Dispatching under the hiring hall’s union contract is driven by the goal of
equalizing earnings among longshoreman. 200 To achieve this, a strict
rotation policy guided the dispatch of eligible workers, and a public
display, known as the “peg board,” allowed all who used the hiring hall to
determine that no one had been dispatched out of turn. 201 Moreover, new
195. MONTGOMERY, supra note 101, at 96-111.
196. Id.
197. In 1934, a militant strike by San Francisco’s longshoreman turned the tide. Pitched class
struggle, portending the coming battles that established industrial unionism throughout basic industry,
created the hiring hall still administered by the International Longshoreman and Warehousemen’s
Union (ILWU). It was the culmination of dockworkers longstanding fight to wrest control of hiring
from the employers and those who administered the hated shape-up on behalf of dock owners and
shipping companies. ART PREIS, LABOR’S GIANT STEP: TWENTY YEARS OF THE CIO 31-33 (2d ed.
1972). Indeed, the labor struggles that established the hiring hall in the maritime industry in 1934 are
recognized as having played a unique role in the development of the American union movement.
MONTGOMERY, supra note 101, at 96-111.
198. See LARROWE, supra note 193, at 180.
199. Id. at 139. At the center of the hall is the dispatching office, staffed by union members elected
to the post for a one-year term. The mechanics of dispatching divides the workforce according to skill,
experience, and personal qualifications and lists jobs based on skill and difficulty (to accommodate the
injured and older workers). See id. at 140-42.
200. A key feature of this system is job sharing commonly referred to as “low-man out
dispatching,” which was instituted as part of the agreement that followed the 1934 strike on the West
Coast. See WILLIAM FINLEY, WORK ON THE WATERFRONT: WORKER POWER AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE IN A WEST COAST PORT 44 (1988).
201. Over time, the number of boards multiplied, each offering positions for particular skills and
machine operations. LARROWE, supra note 193, at 150-51. Exceptions to the strict rotation of the
dispatch system were only allowed for disability or lack of qualification. Every four-week period, the
clerk of the hall prepared a report on the earnings of all the gangs of longshoremen and posted a copy in
the hiring hall. When work was plentiful, the system permitted a great deal of choice for dockworkers
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registrants were provided with systematic apprentice-like training that
reinforced hiring hall work rules regulating the pace of work and job
safety. 202 The “goldfish bowl” character of the system, i.e. the creation of a
high level of transparency to the hiring and deployment process, was seen
as crucial for the success of the operation since it allowed all workers to
verify the fairness of the dispatching decisions of the hall. 203
2. Broadway and Hollywood
The Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and the Actors’ Equity Association
(Equity) have utilized hiring halls to effectively represent actors employed
in the movie industry (SAG) and actors and stage managers in professional
theater (Equity) since the early decades of the twentieth century. 204 Then,
as is often the case today, an itinerant lifestyle was a prerequisite to steady
employment in the dramatic arts. SAG and Equity have their origins in
efforts to control abusive and exploitive practices of theater agents – a
variant of the old employment agency business – and collusive efforts of
agents and producers to control access to acting roles and theater jobs.
Agents are a necessity for professional actors who are often at a
disadvantage in the labor market due to the surplus of available actors in
this labor market. Dependence on theater agents’ relationships with
producers and their knowledge of the industry created the classic exploitive
three-way hiring scenario: agents charged actors exorbitant fees for access
to theater jobs and the task of negotiating an actor’s contract of
employment with the theater. 205 Early efforts to regulate exploitive theater
agent practices was undertaken by union-conscious vaudeville performers
in New York who lobbied to have theater agents subject to New York’s
Employment Agency Act which regulated the content of agency contracts
and set limits on the fees which could be charged by the agents. 206
However, in 1928, after Ribnik v. McBride invalidated New Jersey’s
employment agency law, 207 Equity resorted to self-help, developing its own

who could check the work assignments and determine when and if to “peg in.” Those who too often
dodged disagreeable jobs were ostracized for not carrying their weight. See id. at 143-50.
202. See id. at 170-71.
203. Id. at 144.
204. SAG was founded in 1925. Koh Siok Tian Wilson, Talent Agents as Producers: A Historical
Perspective of Screen Actors Guild Regulations and the Rising Conflict with Managers, 21 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 401, 403-04 (2001). Actors’ Equity was founded in New York City in 1913. See EQUITY
AT A GLANCE, <http://www.actorsequity.org/Library/about/about equity_booklet.pdf> (last visited June
5, 2005).
205. Wilson, supra note 205, at 401-02.
206. See EQUITY AT A GLANCE, supra note 205.
207. 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
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licensing system for agents. Permits regulated the fees agents could charge
union members and were required for an agent to do business with
members of Equity. 208
About the same time, actors in Hollywood founded SAG. Hollywood
producers lobbied heavily for legislation that would require licensure of
agents by producers. Actors viewed this as an effort to create one producercontrolled employment agency to control access to acting jobs and to
curtail salaries. SAG became an industry force as a direct response to the
enactment of an industry code that sanctioned the licensure of agents by
producers and the establishment of an industry cap on actor’s salaries. 209
By 1939, SAG negotiated an industry-wide agreement with agency
regulations that required licensure of the agents by the union, not
producers. 210 Contract rules forbid agents – who must act at all times as
fiduciaries on behalf of their client actors – from producing films, a task
that would surely compromise their fiduciary obligations to the actors they
represented. 211
Over the years, theatrical agents’ persistent challenges to SAG’s
regulation of this labor market met with little success. SAG practices were
defended by the Supreme Court based on the peculiar vulnerabilities of the
union membership in the entertainment industry labor market. 212 In this
industry, the hiring hall regulates its members’ relationship with individual
talent agents so that each actor can effectively utilize a chosen agent as an
intermediary without fear of being exploited or abused. By eschewing the
role of an individual agent for its members, i.e. the negotiator of an actor’s
contract with the employer, the union serves as a watchdog over the
triangulated labor market, setting minimum wages and benefits for all and
regulating the overarching standards used by individual actors when
securing the terms and conditions of employment. 213

208. See EQUITY AT A GLANCE, supra note 205; see also Edelstein v. Gillmore, 35 F.2d 723, 72425 (2d Cir. 1929). The right of theater unions to regulate agency fees was upheld when challenged as a
violation of federal anti-trust laws. See H.A. Artists & Assoc., Inc. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S.
704, 706 (1981).
209. Wilson, supra note 205, at 405.
210. Id. at 405-06.
211. Id. at 405.
212. See H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 720 (finding in the context of an anti-trust challenge to union
regulation that “[t]he peculiar structure of the legitimate theater industry, where work is intermittent,
where it is customary if not essential for union members to secure employment through agents, and
where agents’ fees are calculated as a percentage of a member’s wage, makes it impossible for the
union to defend even the integrity of the minimum wages without regulation of agency fees”).
213. See David Zelenski, Talent Agents, Personal Managers, and their Conflicts in the New
Hollywood, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 989-92 (2003).
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3. Waitress Unions in the Food Services Industry
From the early years of the twentieth century until the 1960s,
waitresses organized and ran successful unions based on the hiring hall
model. Labor historian Dorothy Sue Cobble explains that by the end of the
1940s, union waitresses had a majority of their trade under contract in
major cities like New York, San Francisco, and Detroit and had organized
almost one-fourth of waitresses nationwide. 214 Although the jobs were
often of short tenure, the union hiring hall provided members with
portability of benefits, control over hiring, restrictive membership rules,
and monitoring of performance. The union also achieved a sense of
occupational pride in an industry which today is characterized by high
levels of turnover and is rarely considered a career option. Consider
Cobble’s description of waitresses’ brand of occupational unionism:
At the center of occupational unionism lay a reliance on the union-run
hiring halls and the closed shop. The hiring hall provided the union with
a regular means of access to the mobile population that comprised the
hotel and restaurant workforce. Job-seekers went first to the hiring hall,
where, through the use of a rotation system, they were dispatched
according to the time they registered. Those desiring work had to meet
the approval of the union dispatcher and were required to be fully
qualified union members “in good standing.” Unlike the employment
agencies against which the union hiring halls competed, the union-run
agencies prided themselves on offering free service to workers and
employers. 215

As in the entertainment industry, the waitresses, organized by the
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union (HERE), had to face
the exploitive practices of employment agencies. Union members appealed
to workers to avoid the “vampire system” of high-fee employment
agencies. 216 Cobble explains that the hiring hall gave waitresses, not
employers, control over job scheduling, allowing them to determine when
and how much they worked. 217
4. The Construction Industry
By the 1950s, the union hiring hall was embedded in the urban-based,
commercial construction industry, comprised largely of small firms, where
each building trade union operated its own hall. 218 The hiring hall
214. Dorothy Sue Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial Work Force: Lesson from the History of
Waitress Unionism, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 419, 420 (1991).
215. Id. at 423.
216. Id. at 424.
217. Id. at 424, 427.
218. Historically, small firms have dominated the construction industry labor market and hired
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rationalized this labor market. Building contractors could expect a ready
supply of quality skilled workers for the length of their responsibilities on
any given building project. 219 It made “economic sense to use temporary
employees and to rely heavily on the union hiring hall.” 220 Indeed, hiring
halls in this industry “takes workers off contractors’ hands (and payrolls) as
soon as a project is completed.” 221 In the unionized sector of the
construction industry, most contractors were happy to leave the risks or the
control over labor supply to unions. 222 Unlike the bitter struggles that gave
rise to the hiring hall on the docks and in the maritime industry, the union
hiring hall’s position as the prime labor market intermediary in the
construction industry was acquired as a combined result of three factors:
first, the high skill level of the trades and resistance to Taylorist approaches
to work organization; second, a significant level of employer acquiescence,
i.e., the construction contractors’ desire to be relieved of the costly function
of labor recruitment; and, third the union’s need to take charge of directing
worker mobility so as to maintain legitimacy and relevance in the eyes of
its members. 223 In essence, employers in the unionized sector of the
construction industry abdicated the core labor markets functions – e.g.,
hiring and the distribution of benefits (pensions and healthcare) – to unionsponsored LMIs.

skilled craftsmen to work on specific construction projects. Often, the work is seasonal. Relatively low
levels of capital investment, small firm size, and a relatively backward technological base that was
largely impervious to Taylorism provided the material foundations for strong craft unions that exercised
considerable control over the entry to the labor market. Even before the union hiring hall became
institutionalized throughout the organized sector of the construction industry, the building trades unions
were able to secure effective union control of access to the job market through enforcement of the
closed shop, i.e. a combination of requiring the union card or book to work on a job site, the business
agent system, and a closed shop clause in collective bargaining contracts with contractors’ associations.
See MARC LINDER, WARS OF ATTRITION: VIETNAM, THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE AND THE DECLINE OF
CONSTRUCTION UNIONS 116-20 (2000).
219. The role of the union hiring hall is unique to the U.S. construction industry. Unlike other
countries, the building trade unions in the U.S. have long served as a “source of labor supply, as an
agency to furnish men of an established skill on request of the contractor, and as a means of moving
labor away from areas of surplus to areas of short supply.” Id. at 116 (quoting John T. Dunlop, Labor
Management Relations, in DESIGN AND THE PRODUCTION OF HOUSES 259, 262 (1959)).
220. Id. (quoting M.R. LEFKOE, THE CRISIS IN CONSTRUCTION: THERE IS AN ANSWER 34 (1970)).
221. Id. (citing ROYAL E. MONTGOMERY, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE CHICAGO BUILDING
TRADES 8 (1927)).
222. Id. at 117.
223. See id. at 116-18. In the construction industry, the high degree of control the union hiring hall
exercises over selection and dispatch of union members is in effect a quid pro quo for the building
contractor’s almost unconditional right to dismiss a union member in a high velocity labor market
where the union’s desire to minimize frictional unemployment is the paramount concern.
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C. Labor Unions as Oppressors: Federal Regulation of Union Hiring Halls
to Prevent Employee Abuse at the Hands of Labor-Sponsored Market
Intermediaries
Unregulated LMIs of all kinds have been purveyors of workplace
abuse. The post-World War II era demonstrates that a union hiring hall’s
role in the employment relationship, not unlike that of profit-driven LMIs,
can lead to abuses. Workers in industries where union hiring halls provided
an entry point into the labor market were particularly susceptible to
bureaucratic abuses at the hands of undemocratic union officials, mob
influence, 224 and racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices.
Criminal racketeering and mob infiltration was dramatized in the 1954
Hollywood classic, On the Waterfront, which presented the dark, abusive
side of union hiring hall practices in the longshoring industry. 225 Testimony
to the McClellan Commission hearings in Congress documented the
corruption and violence perpetrated against rank and file workers by mobinfluenced unions. 226 In the 1960s, civil rights activists pointed to the
racially discriminatory uses of the union hiring halls’ gatekeeping functions
as a barrier to fair employment that was responsible for the widespread
exclusion of African American workers from skilled jobs and apprentice
positions throughout the skilled trades. 227
The industrial pluralist legal framework put in place by the 1947 TaftHartley Amendments 228 and the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Amendments 229 to
the NLRA created a regulatory framework to redress the abuse of workers’
rights by labor unions and their officials. These amendments had important
consequences for the regulation of the hiring hall as an LMI. Although
driven primarily by the employing class’s post-World War II assault on the
accumulated economic and social power of the American labor
movement, 230 both sets of amendments to federal labor law were also

224. See HERMAN BENSON, REBELS, REFORMERS, AND RACKETEERS: HOW INSURGENTS
TRANSFORMED THE LABOR MOVEMENT 130-31, 194-97 (2005).
225. ON THE WATERFRONT (Horizon Pictures 1954).
226. See MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA 217-18 (1994);
GRACE PALLADINO, SKILLED HANDS, STRONG SPIRITS, A CENTURY OF BUILDING TRADES HISTORY
148-49 (2005).
227. See HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE, WORK AND
THE LAW 235-59 (1977).
228. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (2006).
229. The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) and a related series
of amendments to the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006).
230. See, e.g., DUBOFSKY, supra note 227, at 201-08; GEORGE LIPSITZ, CLASS AND CULTURE IN
COLD WAR AMERICA: “A RAINBOW AT MIDNIGHT” 37-111 (1982) (cataloguing the breadth of the postwar strike wave and widespread rank and file protests opposing the Taft-Hartley amendments).
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animated by the reality (and even larger mythos) of the “union boss” and
organized criminal infiltration of certain sectors of the labor movement.
The impact of Congressional reform of federal labor law on the union
hiring hall was, therefore, contradictory. On the one hand, it gave rise to a
regulatory regime that created fairness and transparency in the operation of
the hiring hall. On the other, it circumscribed the reach of the union hiring
hall, calling into question its legality in many industries and undermining
labor’s ability to use the union hiring hall model to organize new members
in non-standard labor markets.
Taft-Hartley’s ban of the closed shop was, perhaps, the most
important legal change affecting the union hiring hall. Banning the closed
shop threatened to eviscerate the union hiring hall’s role as an LMI,
through which the union wrested exclusive control of hiring from the
employer. 231 In a host of industries, including longshoring, entertainment,
and construction, the closed shop and the hiring hall model were
intertwined, protecting the union’s ability negotiate the terms and
conditions of employment as well as setting the terms of hiring workers in
seasonal or intermittent labor markets where NLRA-sanctioned methods of
long-term organizing and establishing collective bargaining units through
elections simply do not work. 232 It took more than a decade before the
Landrum Griffin Amendments mitigated the potentially adverse
consequences of banning closed shop hiring halls in the construction
industry by adding section 8(f) to the NLRA. 233 Under 8(f), an employer
“engaged primarily” in construction or a union of construction employees
does not commit an unfair labor practice by negotiating a collective
bargaining agreement at a worksite in advance of the union establishing
majority status. 234 In order to “take into account the occasional nature of
employment in the building and construction trades,” 235 section 8(f)
authorizes the union to act as gatekeeper and mediator of the employment
relationship by legalizing pre-hire agreements that require the employer to
choose its prospective workforce from the union’s hiring hall. 236 As
Senator Taft emphasized, the hiring hall is not “necessarily illegal” and
employers “should be able to make a contract with the union as an
231. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1533 n.253 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992); see Lynn
A. Mourey, Prehire Agreements: Do the Deklewa Rules Effectuate Labor Policy?, CONSTRUCTION
LAWYER, Jan. 1991, at 21, 21.
232. See Mark D. Meredith, From Dancing Halls to Hiring Halls: Actors’ Equity and the Closed
Shop Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 178, 203-06 (1996).
233. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f).
234. Id.
235. S. Rep. 86-187, at 28 (1959).
236. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(f).
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employment agency . . . and in the normal course of events to accept men
sent to [them] by the hiring hall.” 237 Outside of the construction industry,
however, pre-hire agreements remained unlawful and cannot presently be
used to organize new bargaining units in other developing contingent labor
markets under the NLRA’s framework.
The LMRA also created a new class of union-committed unfair labor
practices. 238 Hence, a union hiring hall cannot force an employer to
discriminate against applicants or employees so as to encourage or
discourage union membership, 239 nor can it make access to skills programs
dependent on union membership or on a requirement that referral be from a
union member. 240 Access to referral list information and out-of-work lists
that serve as the basis for job referrals must be made available to all
persons using the hiring hall. Unions are legally required to abide by these
lists that determine the order in which applicants are to be referred and to
fairly represent all of their members. 241 Users of union hiring halls now
have a multiplicity of overlapping forums in which to bring a claim against
a union for discriminatory or unfair practices related to the administration
of the hiring hall. Union hiring halls are subject to unfair labor practice
charges before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and to suit in
federal court by any user when a departure from established hiring hall
procedures results in a denial of employment. 242 In conjunction with
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley amendments, 243 the LMRDA allows union
members to challenge irregularities in the internal governance of a labor
union. 244 Under the LMRDA, union hiring halls cannot charge fees not
reasonably related to the cost of providing their services. 245 Not
unimportantly, users of the union hiring hall have the right to a jury trial
237. Quoted in Local 357, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen, and Helpers of Am.
v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1961). The legislative history of 8(f) makes it clear that a union hiring
hall is essential in certain casual or seasonal labor markets and, in those contexts, should not be subject
to limitation by the closed shop provision of § 8(a)(3) or subject a union to § 8(b) unfair labor practices
because it discriminates by “encouraging . . . union membership.” S. Rep. 86-187, at 27-29 (1959).
238. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b).
239. See David J. Oliveiri, Unions’ Discriminatory Operation of Exclusive Hiring Hall as Unfair
Labor Practice Under Section 8(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 73 A.L.R. FED. 171, § 3
(1985).
240. NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 549 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1977);
IBEW Local 99 (Crawford Electric Construction Co), 214 N.L.R.B. 723 (1974).
241. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 232, at 1543-46.
242. NLRB v. Local 139, IUOE, 796 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers’
Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1974).
243. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
244. Title I of the LMRDA affords union members a “Bill of Rights,” 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15, further
expanding the duty of fair representation protections of the NLRA first established in Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
245. 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(6).
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and a wide range of damage remedies against the hiring hall because it is a
labor organization. 246 Comprehensive federal regulation of the hiring hall
flows from its dual function, i.e. as a union, which gives it the power to
negotiate the terms and conditions of its members and as an institution that
“refers workers for employment” 247 and thus controls the terms of entry to
a given labor market. In Breinenger v. Sheet Metal Workers, Justice
Brennan forcefully explained that the added obligation of referring
workers, which a hiring hall assumes, increases its power and,
concomitantly, its fiduciary obligation to those who use the hall. 248 Based
on Breinenger, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “[w]hen a
union operates a hiring hall and assumes a dual role of employer and
representative, its obligation to deal fairly extends to all users of the hiring
hall.” 249
Amendments to the NLRA, coupled with the LMRDA’s requirements
of union reporting and financial disclosure has made the hiring hall’s
finances and system of member deployment highly transparent and its
operations easily subject to open scrutiny by users to ensure fair, neutral
practices. 250 Hence, union halls are subject to penalties for violating the
rights of a worker that are far greater in scope than those imposed upon any
other LMI. In sum, developments in federal labor law have made union
hiring halls the most regulated and transparent LMI, especially when
compared to the opaque methods of operation of the unregulated modern
temp agency. 251
D. The Short-Lived Comprehensive Regulations of Labor Market
Intermediaries at the Height of the Industrial Pluralist Era
By the1960s, union-sponsored hiring halls and for-profit LMIs were
both governed by comprehensive regulatory schemes, albeit one federal
and the other state-based and less uniform. Federal labor law tightly

246. See, e.g., NLRB v. Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 575, 773 F.2d 746, 749-50 (6th Cir.
1985).
247. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 88 (1989).
248. Id. at 89 (“[I]f a union does wield additional power in a hiring hall by assuming the
employer’s role, its responsibility to exercise that power fairly increases rather than decreases. That has
been the logic of our duty of fair representation cases since Steel . . . .”) (citation omitted).
249. Plumbers and Pipe Fitters Local Union No. 32 v. NLRB, 50 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(citing inter alia, Breininger, 493 U.S. at 89) (emphasis added); see also Jacoby v. NLRB, 233 F.3d
611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (explaining that with respect the operation of an exclusive hiring hall, the
union has a “heightened duty of fair dealing”).
250. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 431, 436, 439; see also LABOR UNION LAW AND REGULATION
213-18 (William W. Osborne, Jr. et al. eds., 2003).
251. See supra Part II.
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regulated the union hiring hall, curbing the labor bureaucracy’s ability to
abuse workers deployed by the union-operated halls. At the same time,
most states regulated private employment agencies to shield workers from
excessive fee-charging and other common abuses. These state laws
governed the emerging temporary help industry which had, by this time,
established a base of significant size by modeling itself on that branch of
the old employment agency business in which the agent remained tied to
the worker as a paymaster or “employer” for the life of the job or series of
jobs. 252 The reach of employment agencies was challenged by the stateadministered public employment agencies that offered a no-fee, statesponsored entry point into the labor market. 253
Given the functionally equivalent role of the hiring hall and the forprofit temporary employment agency, it made sense that roughly
comparable regulatory schemes would govern the two most common forms
of LMIs, with the hiring hall serving the blue collar, industrial sector and
the temporary help agency serving the burgeoning non-industrial sectors of
the U.S. economy. As Steven Willborn explains, both of these LMIs limit
frictional unemployment, i.e. the time a worker spends searching for work,
and both have the potential to provide an institutional framework that
allows workers to acquire medical/welfare coverage and pension benefits
that otherwise would be unavailable to them as contingent workers. 254
Further, both union hiring halls and commercial temp and staffing agencies
negotiate and enter into contracts with employers covering the terms and
conditions of the workers to be deployed to those employers. 255
But significant differences separate the union hiring hall from the
commercial staffing firm. Workers organized and dispensed by temp
agencies consistently experience substandard wages, non-existent benefits,
high levels of alienation, and long-term economic insecurity, 256 while
workers organized and represented by union hiring halls are not subject
these kinds of exploitation and uncertainty. Rarely, if at all, are workers
employed through union hiring halls considered “contingent” since they
have acquired a level of income, job stability, and benefits that are
characteristic of workers in standard labor markets. 257 Moreover, a union
252. Gonos, supra note 48, at 593.
253. See supra Part III.
254. Willborn, supra note 4, at 85-95. Of course, as Willborn also points out, even though both
union hiring halls and staffing firms are in a position to institute multi-employer benefits plans, such
plans are routinely provided only by union hiring halls. Id.
255. See infra Part VII (expanding on this point when presenting the rationale for a more extensive
regulation of the mediating role temp agency).
256. See supra Part II.
257. See Willborn supra note 4, at 90-91.
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hiring hall’s representation and collective bargaining functions
constructively redress the unequal bargaining power and employer
advantage inherent in unorganized labor markets. 258 Accordingly, the union
hiring hall’s mediating role differs fundamentally from that of profit-driven
LMIs whose mediating role has historically amplified the inequality of
bargaining power that advantages employers in their dealings with
unorganized workers. 259 This key difference explains why, since the dawn
of American capitalism, employers have embraced commercial
intermediaries, gladly ceding to them the role of gatekeeper to certain labor
markets, but rail against the mediating role of unions as unnecessary
outsiders or “third-parties” in the employment relationship, and accusing
them of standing in the way of one-to-one employer/employee negotiations
and interfering with the operation of free contract in the labor market. 260
A second, and largely unexplored, distinction between union hiring
halls and profit-driven staffing agencies is the disparate treatment they
received from government regulators as the industrial pluralist framework
unraveled. By the early 1970s, radically divergent regulatory regimes
emerged. On the federal level, tight regulation of the union hiring hall
continued. On the state-level, an often-ignored radical transformation of
employment agency laws occurred. As described in the next section, the
newly launched “temporary” employment agency industry orchestrated a
state-by-state campaign that placed the temp agency and its prodigy outside
the comprehensive legal schemes governing traditional employment
agencies. Consequently, the mediating and representational functions of the
union hiring hall, for better and worse, remain tightly regulated today,
while virtually the same functions remain beyond government scrutiny
when performed by for-profit temporary help or staffing agencies. Not a
better business model or greater efficiency, but a stark disparity in
government regulation, then, explains the dominance of the profit-driven
temp agency in today’s labor markets. The next section outlines how this
inconsistent and largely inchoate regulatory paradigm came to govern
similarly situated LMIs in contingent and temporary U.S. labor markets.
258. See, e.g., Norris-La Guardia Act, ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 102
(2006)).
259. See the discussion in Part II concerning the way that commercial staffing agencies deny or
hide their representative function and negotiate contractual arrangements that deploy workers at lower
wage levels and strip workers of employment benefits.
260. Commonwealth v. Pullis (1806), reported in 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY59, 59-248 (John R. Commons et al., eds., 1910) (presenting the classic legal
formulation of the employing class’s visceral disdain for the union as an outside force interfering with
the master-servant relationship and free market forces); see generally Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011
(Mass. 1900) (outlawing concerted activity which has as its goal the creation of a closed shop).
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V. UNDER THE RADAR: HOW DEREGULATION PAVED THE WAY FOR THE
DOMINANCE OF THE FOR-PROFIT TEMPORARY HELP AGENCY IN
CONTINGENT LABOR MARKETS
Popular and legislative enmity towards agency fee-charging in the
Post-World War II period, along with a restructured U.S. labor market,
spurred a moribund employment agency industry to reinvent itself. What
resulted was the temporary help staffing industry. The legal focus of this
nascent industry 261 was to place itself beyond the reach of the of state
employment agency laws, particularly those that limited, or forced the
disclosure of, agency fees. But directly challenging the legitimacy of state
regulation of fees was not a battle the temp industry could easily win. The
courts of Massachusetts and New York, for example, made it clear that
regulation of employment agency fees was comfortably within the police
powers of state government. 262 Moreover, even if the temp industry could
make headway on the fee ceiling problem confronting it, state laws would
still require disclosure of the fee schedule to workers who would make use
of the agency, making public the mark-up or spread between what a temp
agency paid a worker and the amount the temp agency billed a
client/employer for the workers it deployed. 263
What turned out to be the winning legal tack was first presented in the
mid-1950s by the young temp industry’s leader, Manpower, Inc., and its
political arm, the National Association of Temporary Services (NATS),
when it initiated lawsuits challenging the employment agency statutes in
Florida, Nebraska, and New Jersey. In each suit Manpower claimed that a
temporary help service firm – the official title the industry was now using –
was not an employment agency, but rather an employer. Manpower sought
declaratory and injunctive relief on these grounds to avoid state licensing
and regulation of its franchisees as employment agencies (and, implicitly,
to establish them in practice as bona fide employers). The results of the
litigation were mixed.

261. In 1959, the temporary help service industry still represented a small fraction of the private
employment agency business. In California, for example, out of a total of 2678 licensed employment
agencies, only 91 were temporary help services. See Adams, supra note 171, at 752-53 (citing
California Department of Industrial Relations data).
262. G&M Employment Serv., Inc., v. Commonwealth, 265 N.E.2d 476, 481 (Mass. 1970); Gail
Turner Nursing Agency, Inc., v. State, 190 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Sup. Ct. 1959). There were exceptions. The
high court of Colorado struck down employment agency statutory provisions that were deemed
excessively restrictive or confiscatory, i.e. set too low a ceiling on fees that could be charged for access
to a job. People v. Albrecht, 358 P.2d 4 (Colo. 1960).
263. In 1960, twenty-three states set maximum placement fees; eighteen required agencies to
submit fee schedules to authorities. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 187.
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In Florida Industrial Commission v. Manpower, Inc. of Miami, 264 the
Florida Supreme Court held that Manpower, a temporary staffing service,
was not a “private employment agency” within the purview of Florida’s
employment agency statute. At that time, the Florida statute defined an
employment agency as “any person, firm or corporation, who for hire or for
profit, shall undertake to secure employment or help [for another] or offers
to secure employment or help.” 265 The statute defined the fee charged by an
employment agency as “the difference between the amount of money
received by any person, who furnishes employees . . . and the amount paid
by said person receiving said amount of money to the employees . . . whom
he hires.” 266 Simply put, the statute considered the employment agency’s
fee as a mark-up, i.e. the difference between what the temp agency pays the
worker and the amount it receives from the business to which it provides
the temp worker, and regulated it as such.
The Court studiously avoided challenging the state’s right to regulate
agency fees or even analyzing whether a temp agency charges a fee to
workers. Instead, the Florida high court strained basic rules of grammar to
redefine Manpower’s function as falling outside the statute. Manpower,
stated the court, provides “various types of services for its customers,
including among others, typists, stenographers, comptometer operators,
general office workers, bookkeepers, factory workers . . . .” 267 Proper
grammar would, of course, have required the Court to state that Manpower
“provides typing services, stenographic services, etc”. The Court’s
maladroit grammar is not accidental. Labeling typists and factory workers
as “services” is essential to the Court’s reasoning since it found that a
temporary help agency is not an employment agency because it provides a
“service” to its clients, i.e. – it does not provide business clients with
human labor.
Manpower hires its own employees and sends them to the customer to
perform the service required . . . The customer enters into a contract with
Manpower for the particular service to be performed and pays the contract
price to Manpower. Manpower pays the employee at a salary agreed upon
between Manpower and the employee. 268
The Court ignored the user firm’s control and direction of the temps
deployed to its place of business and declared that Manpower’s employer

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

91 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1956).
Id. at 198.
Id. at 198-99.
Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
Id.
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status flows from that fact that it “retains control over its employees, and
can substitute one employee for another in any particular job.” 269
The Court conceded that the statute’s plain language subjected
Manpower to regulation as an employment agency since it “secures or
provides help” for its customers. 270 But, the plain language, says the Court,
would also result in a host of different business who are not temp agencies
being improperly subject to employment agency law. For example, “a court
reporter who sends his employee to a law office to take a deposition or a
detective agency which sends its employee to guard documents [and]
accountants whose employees do bookkeeping service for customers” 271
would fall within the statute’s reach. The court concluded that the fact that
Manpower “secured help” for its customers was not controlling, and “by
the same token,” the definition of fee was also not applicable to the profit
inuring to Manpower. 272 The problem with the Court’s reasoning, of
course, is that unlike the other businesses named, Manpower neither
provides or guarantees the provision to its customers of any particular
product or service; rather, it provides only the labor, i.e. “help,” for any
kind of work the customer requires. In this regard, the Court’s analysis fails
to recognize the fundamental difference between subcontracting for a
product or service and what is called labor-only contracting. 273
The court in Florida Industrial Commission rejected the usual judicial
obligation to defer to the state Labor Commission’s interpretation of the
statute because, as a matter of policy, it did not view Manpower as
exhibiting “the evils incident to private employment agencies which
statutes such as ours were enacted to correct.” 274 Citing the string of abuses
which Justice Brandeis enumerated in his dissent in Adams v. Tanner, the
Court concluded that, “clearly, the method of operation of Manpower is
susceptible to none of the abuses mentioned” in Adams v. Tanner. 275
Therefore, the Court found that Manpower did not function as an
employment agency, but rather was “a legitimate business, performing a
new type of service to individuals and firms.” 276
269. Id.
270. Id. at 199.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. E. Epstein & J. Monat, Labor Contracting and Its Regulation: I, 107 INT’L LAB. REV. 451, 451
(1973) (defining labor-only contracting as an “oral or written contract between an employer and an
intermediary having as a major if not exclusive object the supply of labour” as opposed to a product or a
service).
274. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 91 So. 2d at 200.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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Courts in Nebraska 277 and New Jersey, 278 however, rejected the
position advanced by Manpower and the Florida Court’s reasoning. The
New Jersey ruling, Manpower, Inc. of New Jersey v. Richman, provides the
well-developed argument for subjecting temp agencies to state regulation.
This case pitted the soon-to-become temp industry giant against the New
Jersey Commissioner of Labor. Manpower sought exemption from that
state’s employment agency licensing and fee regulation requirements on
the grounds that it was an employer not an agency. 279 The ruling is in all
respects at odds with Florida Industrial Commission. The judge held that
Manpower was an employment agency and described the labor market
function of the upstart temp industry as that of an intermediary that
procures labor for employers – temporary clerical workers to business and
unskilled workers to industry. 280 This challenged Manpower’s argument
that it was primarily a direct employer of others. The court explained that a
temporary help agency can only be said to be in an employer-employee
relationship with temp workers “in the broad use of the phrase” because, as
the court noted, Manpower “ha[d] no supervision or control over the work
once he or she report[ed] on the job . . . . [I]t [was] the customer who
direct[ed] and control[led] the workers, assign[ed] the work . . . , direct[ed]
the manner of doing it, fixe[d] the hours of work, recess and the like.” 281
Once the workers were deployed to an assigned workplace by Manpower,
“a master and servant relationship [was] created between the worker and
the customer.” 282 Indeed, Manpower “[knew] nothing of what the worker
277. Nebraska ex rel. Weasmer v. Manpower of Omaha, Inc., 73 N.W.2d 692, 697 (Neb. 1955).
The Nebraska Supreme Court tersely rejected Manpower’s argument that its activity as described in the
complaint fell outside the statute regulating employment agencies. Unfortunately, the high court
dismissed the case on a technicality, the State’s failure to prove service of a bill of exceptions on
defendant. Id. at 700.
278. Manpower, Inc. of N.J. v. Richman, No. L-22576-56, slip op. (Super. Ct. N.J. June 24, 1957).
279. Id. at 2, 3-5. Notably, the definition of employment agency in the New Jersey law was
substantively the same as the Florida statute: an employment agency was “the business of procuring or
offering to procure help or employment, or the giving of information as to where help or employment
may be procured.” 1951 N.J. Laws 1195 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8-24(1) (1952)). The fee is
also similarly defined, as “the difference between the amount of money received by any person who . . .
furnishes employees . . . and the amount paid by such person or person to the employees.” 1951 N.J.
Laws 1196 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8-24(1) (1952)) Indeed, the definition of the fee would be
“meaningless unless the act itself is taken to include ...[Manpower’s]type of operation.” Richman, No.
L-22576-56, slip op. at 8.
280. Richman, No. L-22576-56, slip op. at 6-8. Typists and stenographers – mostly “women,
usually married, who look for part-time work to supplement the family income” – were deployed to
office jobs after skills and/or employment history was verified and skills were matched with the
requirements of the assignment. Unskilled industrial workers gathered in the agency’s large rooms on
benches or chairs, and the office manager sat at a phone. As request came in, he filled them from among
the men in the room. See id. at 3-4.
281. Id. at 5.
282. Id.
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[was] doing” on the job. 283
The court also rejected Manpower’s argument that the temp agency’s
task, “procuring and furnishing” labor to another, was the functional
equivalent of “doing the work” of the employer. 284 Indeed, the judge noted
that the most common, widely-cited definition of employment agency
included agencies that engage in “the employment of laborers to work for
another.” 285 The New Jersey judge concluded that the Florida Supreme
Court’s ruling was a “very narrow interpretation of the Employment
Agency Act” that looked to form rather than to the substance. 286 There was
no doubt, said the judge,
but that Manpower is striving to avoid the regulations of the State
Employment Agency Acts and has meticulously set up its method of
operations, the forms it uses, and so forth, to try to avoid the label
“employment agency.” In substance, though, plaintiff is in the business
of procuring and furnishing help or employment for a fee and therefore is
subject to the New Jersey act. 287

At the same time, the court recognized that the temp agency should
remain legally accountable for its strictly ministerial role of withholding
income taxes and social security, paying unemploy- ment contributions,
and carrying workmen’s compensation insurance. 288 In this regard, the
court explained that Manpower was also properly classified as an employer
under New Jersey employment statutes. 289
What is important is that while there may be an employer-employee
relationship as between [Manpower] and the worker, sufficient to bring
plaintiff under the unemployment act and even the Workmen’s
Compensation law, there is also a master and servant relationship
between the customer and the worker and the plaintiff is in the business
of creating this relationship for a fee and is therefore an employment
agency under our act. 290

As a matter of public policy, the court noted that an unregulated temp
agency is as susceptible of abusing and exploiting workers as are other
types of employment agents. This is because the temp agency, like all
283. Id. at 6.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 9 (quoting the Tennessee employment agency statute as cited in MacMillan v. City of
Knoxville, 202 S.W. 65, 66 (Tenn. 1918)). Notably, Florida Industrial Commission also cites
MacMillan, see 91 So. 2d at 198, but ignores this specific language, “employment of laborers to work
for another,” severely undermining the reasoning used by the Florida Supreme Court to reach its
conclusion that Manpower was an employer and not an employment agent.
286. Richman, No. L-22576-56, slip op. at 10.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 11-12.
290. Id. at 12.
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employment agencies, charges a fee in exchange for access to employment.
For this reason, it is important for a man looking for “a day’s work . . . to
know what Manpower is charging the customer for his work, or, to put it
another way, it is important for the worker to know how the money paid by
the customer will be divided as between plaintiff and himself.” 291 The New
Jersey court’s staunch defense of state regulation of temp agencies presents
two important lessons. First, the court articulated the need for institutional
transparency and accountability for the fee a temporary agency charges a
worker, no matter how it is disguised. This restates the core purpose of all
statutes that regulate employment agencies. Second, the court’s reasoning
sought to capture the complex duality of the temporary employment
agency’s market function by recognizing that a temp agency can have a
dual status – as an employment agency and as an employer. In other words,
a temp agency is properly subject to employment agency law and
workplace laws governing employers. The court’s characterization of the
legal status of the temp agency thus parallels the dual status that federal
courts have assigned the union hiring hall under federal labor law. 292
Unfortunately, other state courts never had the opportunity to follow the
reasoning presented in New Jersey’s Manpower v. Richman ruling. Given
the mixed results of the Florida, Nebraska, and New Jersey rulings, the
young temp industry’s litigation strategy to exempt itself from the states’
employment agency laws proved to be problematic and seems to have been
suspended. Following these rulings, NATS turned to lobbying and
legislative reform.
The temporary help industry rapidly escaped regulation once it figured
out that its status as an agency could be avoided by enacting simple
amendments to state employment agency laws. Consider Maryland’s Fee
Charging Employment Agency Law, a fair representative of the statutory
amendments the temp industry successfully enacted. The Maryland statute
was amended to read that an employment agency “shall not include any
person conducting a business which consists of employing individuals
directly for the purpose of furnishing part-time or temporary help to
others.” 293 Language of this sort was first put in place in the two largest
temp-agency markets, New York in 1958 and California in 1960. 294 By
291. Id. at 13.
292. See Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 88-89 (1989);
supra Part IV.C .
293. MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 9-101(d)(1) (West 2008).
294. See George Gonos, The Contest of Employer Status in the Postwar United States: The Case of
Temporary Help Firms, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 81, 94-95 (1997); see also Chris Forde, You Know We
are Not an Employment Agency: Manpower, Government, and the Development of the Temporary Help
Industry in Britain, 9 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 337, 357-58, 360 (2008) (noting the legislative
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1971, all but two states had either amended their statutes to exclude temp
agencies from the definition of employment agency or achieved the same
result by administrative interpretation of employment agency statutes. 295
Testimony and documents presented at federal congressional hearings
on day labor legislation in 1971 attributed the rapid exemption of temp
agencies from state regulation to “the very active campaign for exclusion,
with Manpower, Inc., carrying the ball.” 296 Unfortunately, over the
relatively short course of the NATS-coordinated, state-by-state lobbying
campaign to escape regulation, 297 no labor organization or other watchdog
agency stepped up to challenge temp industry by exposing the exploitive
hidden fees and other problems faced by temp agency workers. In short,
there was no pressure from anywhere to back up the critical assaults on the
industry of the kind being made by U.S. Senator Walter Mondale, who in
1971 attacked the “unconscionable fees” charged to temp workers. 298
Consequently, federal legislative initiatives aiming to redress the problems
of the now-deregulated industry faced strong opposition from a temp
agency lobby flush with success at the state level and never made it out of
committee. 299 By 1982, a decade after consolidating a regulation-free legal
environment for the temp industry, NATS’ official publication,
Contemporary Times, could justifiably claim that “[o]ne of the most
important reasons for NATS’ existence is to keep the industry free of
regulation . . . . NATS constantly monitors all [government] actions –
national, state and local.” 300
A dramatic expansion in the use of temp agency labor followed the
industry’s unchallenged and successful deregulation effort. By the end of
the twentieth century, the temp agency industry’s public relations
pronouncements safely claimed that temporary help firms were not
employment agencies and did not charge fees. 301 These claims were
possible, of course, only because the states failed to exercise their police
powers to regulate the exorbitant “hidden fees” that make billions for the
developments in the states, and the similar concept in Britain).
295. Gonos, supra note 295, at 95.
296. A Bill to Establish and Protect the Rights of Day Laborers: Hearing on H.R. 10349 Before the
Special Subcommittee on Labor of the H. Committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong. 199 (1971)
(statement of Abner Mikva, Illinois Representative).
297. See Gonos, supra note 294, at 94-97.
298. 117 CONG. REC. S36653 (Oct 19, 1971).
299. Gonos, supra note 138, at 23-24.
300. Legislative Monitoring – An Association Necessity, CONTEMPORARY TIMES, Winter 1982, at
15.
301. Recruitment advertisements boast that temporary staffing firms charge “no fees” that they are
“Not an agency – Never a fee” and that there is “Never a fee to the job seeker.” The claim is “All Fees
Company Paid.” See Gonos, supra note 48, at 590.
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temp industry but afford sub-standard wages for those deployed by it.
Though wage and hour violations by temp agencies are indeed a real
problem, particularly at the industry’s low end, 302 the substandard wage
structure of the temp industry cannot be challenged under existing wage
and hour laws. 303 The larger issue – the “hidden fee” captured by temp
agencies through their contractural arrangements with client firms –
remains totally invisible under wage and hour law. It is this mandatory, but
“hidden fee,” of course, that results in a rate of compensation for temp
workers far below what permanent workers earn for performing
comparable tasks. Unfortunately, discussion of the consequences of work
law’s failure to legally identify and regulate the “hidden fee” extracted
from agency-deployed temps has also disappeared from the legal discourse.
Yet, for-profit LMIs are now a permanent, ubiquitous feature of labor
markets throughout the economy. It is time to revive the issue of regulating
the fees charged to workers who are deployed by the temp agency industry.
VI. CONTESTING THE LEGAL STATUS OF FOR-PROFIT LABOR MARKET
INTERMEDIARIES IN TWENTY FIRST CENTURY LABOR MARKETS
The neo-liberal globalization polices that foisted flexible and lean
production methods upon late twentieth century labor markets gave rise to
a new round of workplace struggles and legal contests relevant to a
reexamination of the legal status of profit driven LMIs. We examine four
such contests that challenged the prevailing legal status of the for-profit
LMIs. We first look at the case of “perma-temps” at Microsoft Corporation
whose legal action resulted in their inclusion in the company’s lucrative
stock option plans. We next discuss the legal obstacles that labor unions
have faced in trying to win collective bargaining rights for temp agency
workers under federal labor law. Third, we explore how states are creating
government-sponsored, public LMIs to provide substantial improvements
in nonstandard labor markets employing home health care aides. We
conclude with a review of immigrant day laborers’ fight to eliminate the
302. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 40, at 25-26; see also National Employment Law Project,
A Comparison of Day Labor Statutes as of 2005 <http://nelp.3cdn.net/715918a807040
aa8fc_29m6bhv42.pdf.> (last visited on Aug. 8, 2009) (compiling statutes addressing abuses).
303. Under FLSA, an agency charging workers recruitment fees to gain access to employment are
actionable as an unlawful deduction from wages only if those fees are determined to be “primarily for
the benefit of the employer,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (2006), 29 C.F.R. § 531.35 (2009), and if the payment
of recruitment fees brings the wage paid below the statutory minimum. See Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms,
LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002); Rivera v. The Brickman Group Ltd., Civ. No. 05-1518,
2008 WL 81570, *12-14 (Jan. 7, 2008 E.D. Pa); see generally Andrea L. Schmitt, Ending the Silence:
Thai H-2A Workers, Recruitment Fees and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J.
167 (2007) (applying FLSA standards to recruitment fees charged to Thai H-2A workers).
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exploitive features of the street corner shape-ups that have reappeared in
neighborhoods and parking lots and the industrial-sector temp agencies that
have blossomed in immigrant communities across America. Considered in
the aggregate, these developments suggest workable legal constructs that
contribute to reconceptualizing the tenuous and flawed employer status of
the for-profit LMI.
A. Microsoft’s Perma-temps: Judicial Erosion of the Temp Agency’s
Employer Status
In the 1990s, the legal battle of non-standard workers at Microsoft
Corporation portended a potentially important shift in the way courts
examined the status of temp workers and their relationship to the
businesses where they perform work. In Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 304 the
plaintiffs were long-term “contractors” who worked on software products
integral to the company’s core business. They performed their job at
Microsoft’s offices under the direct supervision of Microsoft managers.
However, because these workers were payrolled through outside staffing
agencies, Microsoft classified them as “temporary” non-employees,
denying them company benefits and other rights and privileges enjoyed by
similarly situated traditional employees. 305 After years of litigation, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately held that the agency temps were
employees of Microsoft – not the staffing firms – and, therefore, entitled to
participate in the company’s highly lucrative stock purchase plan. 306
Vizcaino and the ongoing organizing of high-tech temp workers in
Washington State and other states 307 cast a bright light on a dark side of the
temporary staffing industry’s normative practices: Employment through a
temp agency, as a matter of course, deprives workers of the wages,
benefits, and terms and conditions of employment which accrue to
similarly situated permanent employees. By ruling that Microsoft was the
legal employer of these long-term temp workers with respect to a lucrative
benefit, the Ninth Circuit called into question the temporary staffing
agency’s status as the “real employer” of temp workers. As such, Vizcaino
put forth the potentially explosive proposition that user firms may have the
304. 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996) (Vizcaino I), modified en banc, 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Vizcaino II), enf’d by mandamus, Vizcaino v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 173 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1999).
305. Vizcaino I, 97 F.3d at 1190.
306. Vizcaino II, 120 F.3d at 1012.
307. See van Jaarsveld, supra note 10, at 373-76; see also About WashTech, WASHTECH: A VOICE
FOR THE DIGITAL WORKFORCE <http://www.washtech.org/about/> (providing information on the
efforts and strategies used by Washtech and the Communications Workers of America to organize hightech temp workers) (last visited Aug. 8, 2009).
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legal obligation of employers with respect to the core terms and conditions
of employment of temp agency workers, thereby placing in doubt the
economic efficacy of the widespread use of outside agencies to create a
two-tier workforce with drastically differing sets of rights and rewards. 308
B. Who is the Boss? – Bargaining Rights for Temp Under the NLRA
Three years after the Ninth Circuit’s Vizcaino ruling, the National
Labor Relations Board addressed bargaining unit issues that arose from the
rapid expansion of the contingent workforce and the challenges facing
labor unions at worksites where non-union temp workers are employed
alongside members of a collective bargaining unit of permanent workers.
M.B. Sturgis, 309 posed
the question of whether and under what circumstances employees who
are jointly employed by a “user” employer and a “supplier” employer
[the temp agency] can be included for representational purposes in a
bargaining unit with employees who are solely employed by the user
employer. 310

The triangulated employment relationship present in M.B. Sturgis
typifies the temp agency staffing model: temps from the staffing agency
(the supplier-firm) were deployed to the user employer’s worksite (the user
firm); temps performed the same work as the full-time unionized
employees, were governed by common work and safety rules, and were
subject to the same user-firm supervision as the permanent employees. The
Board found “no evidence of any assignment or direction by the onsite
[temp agency] representative.” 311 Differences in employment conditions
were limited to wage rates, availability of overtime and, presumably, the
rules for hiring and promotions. This landmark decision held that
temporary employees are entitled to bargaining unit status at the user
employer’s place of business without the mutual consent of the user and
supplier firms. 312 The Board held that staffing agencies are not
308. This fundamental principle enuncited by Vizcaino was widely recognized as a shift in the
treatment of temp workers even though the practical impact of the decision was limited due to the fact
that the court’s ruling was based on specific pension plan language that other major user firms learned
to avoid by revising the language of their pension and benefit plans, and also because other circuits did
not follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead. But, for a time, Vizcaino seemed to shake the world of corporate
human resources with the possibility that outsourcing of employer responsibilities to staffing agencies –
a central mechanism of the “flexible workforce” – might become financially untenable due to the
obligations that the Ninth Circuit imposed on user firms that employed permatemps.
309. 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000), rev’d in part, Oakwood Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. 76 (2004).
310. Id. at 1298.
311. Id. at 1301.
312. Prior to M.B. Sturgis, Board decisions had established a bargaining unit rule which, in effect,
precluded temporary workers from joining or accreting into a bargaining unit comprised of the user
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“independent employers,” pointing out that “all of the work is being
performed for the user employer” and that “all the employees in fact share
the same employer, i.e., the user employer.” 313 In these circumstances, i.e.,
when the locus of control rests entirely with the user employer, the Board
recognized that the supplier’s consent to include the temp workers in the
unit is irrelevant. Instead, the traditional community of interest test should
determine the composition of the appropriate bargaining unit. 314 The Board
concluded that temp workers may have two employers in these situations
and share a community of interest with permanent employees covered
under the union’s collective bargaining agreement. 315
Shortly thereafter, in Tree of Life, an administrative law judge applied
the M.B. Sturgis joint-employer doctrine to hold that a unionized user firm
was obligated to include agency temps in its bargaining unit and had a duty
to bargain with the union over those aspects of the temps’ working
conditions that it controlled, including the wage rates established by the
bargaining agreement between the union and the user firm. 316 On review,
the Board backed away from a remarkably significant part of the ALJ’s
ruling: that union wage rates be applied to the temps. 317 The Board’s
hesitancy to follow its own reasoning on this aspect of the decision blunted
what would have been a remarkable condemnation of the core exploitive
practice: structuring wage rates in temporary labor markets. Notably,
however, in her concurring opinion, Board Member Liebman stated that
she would have upheld the ALJ’s ruling and applied all the terms and
conditions of the collective bargaining agreement – including those
affecting wages – to the temporary workers, “just as if the [user employer]
had hired them without using an intermediary.” 318 Liebman’s approach
recognized the socioeconomic reality of the triangular employment
relationship, i.e., that the user firm is the primary employer substantially
controlling the terms and conditions of work, and the temp firm functions
only as a market intermediary, supplying labor, 319 entirely dependent for
its margin on the terms agreed upon with the user firm. Although the
majority decision in Tree of Life suggested an unwillingness to provide a
employer’s workers without the consent of both the temporary agency and the user firm. Greenhoot,
Inc., Lee Hospital, 300 N.L.R.B. 947, 948 (1990); 205 N.L.R.B. 250, 251 (1973); see M.B. Sturgis, 331
N.L.R.B. at 1302-06.
313. M.B. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1305.
314. Id. at 1305-06.
315. Id. at 1306.
316. Tree of Life, Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 872 (2001)
317. Id. at 872.
318. Id. at 876 (Liebman, M., concurring).
319. See id. at 875-76.

FREEMAN AND GONOS

158

11/20/2009 11:11:02 AM

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:nn

remedy for the core pay and benefits disparities experienced by temp
workers, the decision did signal the Board’s willingness to adapt labor law
to changing labor markets where temporary staffing firms control virtually
none of the terms and conditions of the workers they supply to client firms.
However, the joint employer doctrine enunciated in M.B. Sturgis
succumbed to the regressive policies pushed by President George W.
Bush’s Board appointees. In 2004, the NLRB issued Oakwood Care
Center, 320 overturning M.B. Sturgis and, implicitly, Tree of Life. In
Oakwood Care Center, the NLRB held that the temp agency and the user
firm constitute a multi-employer bargaining unit, and, hence, both must
consent before the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining
agreement can cover the employees of the temp agency. 321 This position, of
course, rejects applying the joint-employer doctrine to the temp agency
employment paradigm for purposes of union organizing and collective
bargaining. The Board replaced a doctrine that recognized the
socioeconomic realities of the temporary work relationship – under which
the determination of employer status would be based on an examination of
who actually supervises and directs the work of the temp worker – with an
abstract principle of employer choice. 322 Notably, the majority opinion in
Oakwood Care reserved a good deal of its indignation for the Tree of Life
ruling and the application of, what the majority called “the strained logic of
Sturgis,” by which the Board ordered the accretion of temp workers into
the user employer’s bargaining unit and mandated that the temps be subject
to terms of the user employer’s contract with the union. 323
Despite their improvident reversals, the reasoning used in M.B. Sturgis
and Tree of Life, and in Vizcaino, underscores the tenuous employer status
of the profit-driven temp agency. These cases also highlight Professor
Michael Harper’s argument that determining who is an employer for
purposes of collective bargaining should rest on whether a given entity is a
“primary direct capital provider,” i.e., whether a business supplies a

320. 343 N.L.R.B. 659 (2004).
321. Id. at 659.
322. Indeed, “free choice” has replaced what the NLRB long considered the most important factor
in deciding employer status: the degree of control exercised over the work of employees. See Deaton
Truck Line, 143 N.L.R.B. 1372 (1963). Grounding its reasoning in common law precepts, the NLRB
has stated that an employer-employee relationship exists “where the person for whom the services are
performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved, but also the means to be used in
reaching such end.” Id. at 1372. In this regard, the temp agency’s control over workers it deploys is
usually non-existent. See also Wilma Liebman, Labor Law Inside Out, 11 WORKING USA: J. LAB. &
SOC’Y 1, 9 (2008) (arguing that “free choice” to avoid unionization has become the bedrock operative
principle of the Bush-appointed NLRB majority).
323. Oakwood Care, 343 N.L.R.B. at 661.
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substantial proportion of the capital made productive by the employees. 324
The issue of who supervises the temporary employee would not prove
dispositive. In other words, staffing firms would be excluded from the
category of employers, even in circumstances where a staffing agency takes
on a certain degree of supervisory authority over temp workers at a user
firm’s place of business. Harper’s analysis rests on a fundamental structural
characteristic of temp and staffing agencies: these entities perform few, if
any, of the traditional economic functions associated with bona fide
employers that utilize labor to make their capital productive. Professor
Harper’s approach to determining employer status calls attention to the fact
that a temp agency’s legal status as an employer rests largely on the most
ministerial of employer duties 325 – issuance of a paycheck, preparing W-2
forms, withholding taxes, and carrying worker’s compensation insurance.
C. Creating Employers of Record: State-Supported Labor Market
Intermediaries and the Lessons of Organizing Home Health Care Aides
Workers and progressive reformers such as John Commons and his
followers who led the early twentieth-century legislative reform efforts
addressing the social ills of contingent labor markets advocated the
formation of state-run, public employment agencies to replace the
exploitive, profit-driven employment agency. 326 These reformers
recognized that some type of LMI – preferably one that was not profitdriven – is often necessary to create efficient and well-functioning labor
markets. 327 Almost a century later, under the guidance of organized labor,
tens of thousands of home health care aides (HCAs) 328 in California,
Oregon, Washington, Illinois, and Massachusetts have benefited from the
establishment of government-run LMIs, often referred to as home care
workforce councils or public authorities. 329 Prior to the legislative
324. Michael Harper, The Provision of Capital and Collective Bargaining Responsibilities, in
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVE/SUPPLEMENTS TO
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 77, 77-116. (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1998).
325. While the question of withholding taxes and social security payments from workers is a
relevant factor, it has not been considered determinative. See, e.g., Frederick O. Glass, 135 N.L.R.B.
217, enforced in part, 317 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1963); see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note
232, at 1595.
326. See Henry D. Sayer, State Control of Job Agencies, 20 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 369, 369-371
(1930) (author was former Industrial Commissioner, State of New York).
327. See COMMONS & ANDREWS, supra note 126.
328. These workers provide essential long and short-term health-care assistance to disabled
individuals and the elderly in their homes, allowing them to avoid extended stays in costlier nursing
homes or assisted living centers.
329. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, WORKING TOGETHER FOR QUALITY PERSONAL
CARE: HOW SEIU HAS WORKED IN COALITION WITH CONSUMERS AND ADVOCATES TO WIN
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enactment of these public authorities or workforce councils, HCAs were
classified as independent contractors, directly hired and supervised by
individuals with disabilities or age-related infirmities, but receiving a
government paycheck from state and federal welfare fund coffers. Under
this arrangement, a profound practical problem faced HCAs who attempted
to improve wages or benefits: the designated employer – the sick, disabled
or elderly individual they served – had no legal authority to change the pay
rates or provide benefits. These workers experienced all the classic
problems associated with temporary work for multiple, serial employers:
intermittent employment, transiency, less-than-full-time schedules, and low
wages. HCAs received no work-related benefits and stood outside federal
or state laws granting employees the right to organize and collectively
bargain. 330 As one California worker summed it up, “[w]e were an invisible
workforce, nobody even knew we existed.” 331
For HCAs and certain other non-standard workers, then, it is the
absence of an LMI in contingent and temporary labor markets that gives
rise to exploitation of workers and often adversely impacts employers who
have no effective means for rationalizing hiring and job placement.
Without LMIs, the contingent workforce remains atomized in ways that
prevent the implementation of industry standards or employment benefits.
Moreover, employers in the U.S. labor market who directly employ
temporary and contingent workers commonly misclassify temps as
independent contractors, even when they lack the skills and bargaining
power associated with bona fide independent contractors, such as highly
skilled technicians or skilled tradespeople. 332 Due to the expansive
definition universally used to determine independent contractor status,
persons who are, in reality, “dependent contractors” are deprived of the
right to unionize, and the protection of a myriad of state and federal statutes
that protect employees, but exclude independent contractors. 333
California was the first state to pass legislation enabling the
transformation and rationalization of this contingent labor market. 334 The
WORKFORCE IMPROVEMENT FOR CONSUMER-DIRECTED PERSONAL CARE THROUGH WORKFORCE
COUNCILS (2005), <http://s67.advocateoffice.com/vertical/Sites/%7BA168C1B2-E6E9-4583-8BD19F21D62CA0C4%7D/uploads/%7B94C40E53-4FD4-47D2-AABF-71A33E87A66F%7D.PDF> (last
visited on Aug. 9, 2009).
330. See Linda Delp & Katie Quan, Homecare Worker Organizing in California: An Analysis of a
Successful Strategy, 27 LAB. STUD. J. 1, 3-5 (2002).
331. Id. at 4.
332. See generally Elizabeth Kennedy, Freedom from Independence: Collective Bargaining Rights
for “Dependent Contractors,” 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143 (2005) (discussing vulnerability of
low-wage, unskilled workers who fall under worklaw definitions of independent contractor).
333. Id.
334. See SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, supra note 330, at 3.

FREEMAN AND GONOS

2009]

11/20/2009 11:11:02 AM

TAMING THE EMPLOYMENT SHARKS

161

effort began when the Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
initiated a campaign to organize 74,000 HCAs in Los Angeles in 1987. 335
Organizing these workers proved daunting. Shifting worksites were the
norm, and turnover rates among HCAs were 40 percent. 336 Constant
reorganization was necessary just to maintain a minimum level of
membership. The organizing campaign ultimately turned the corner
through a protracted grassroots legislative campaign of the members that
first resulted in a statutory increase in the hourly raise. 337 In 1992, an
SEIU-led coalition persuaded the state legislature to enact legislation that
enabled county governments to establish a public authority as the employer
of record for the HCAs. 338 The public authorities were granted the
following functions and responsibilities: creating a registry of HCAs to
assist recipients of in-home support services in finding appropriate
employees; establishing a system of referral for HCAs seeking
employment; investigating the qualifications and background of HCAs; and
training providers and recipients. 339 The legislation also expressly gave
recipients the power to hire, fire, and supervise the work of any in-home
supportive service workers. 340 Finally, the authority was mandated to
bargain with the HCA’s union and establish a dues check-off should the
HCAs unionize. 341
In 1997, Los Angeles passed an ordinance enabling a public authority
to employ HCAs. 342 Two years later SEIU won a union election and
established a five-year collective bargaining agreement that provided
improved wages and medical benefits to its members. By that time,
Alameda County and San Francisco had also established public authorities
and the HCAs won labor contracts that included medical benefits, and in
San Francisco, medical and dental benefits. More than 100,000 HCAs,
overwhelmingly female and largely comprised of minorities and
immigrants, were now employed by public authorities and represented by
unions. 343 In 1999, amendments to the enabling state legislation mandated
that each California County establish a public authority as an employer of
335. See Delp & Quan, supra note 331, at 15 tbl. 2.
336. Id. at 4, 6.
337. Id. at 6-8; SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, supra note 330, at 7.
338. Delp & Quan, supra note 331, at 9; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 12301.6, 12302,
12302.25 (West 2008).
339. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12301.6(e).
340. Id at § 12301.6(c)(2)(B).
341. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12302.5.
342. Delp & Quan, supra note 330, at 11, 14 (providing a detailed recounting of the history of this
effort).
343. Id. at 3, 15.
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record for HCAs by 2003 and that the authority have a majority of
consumer/recipients of in-house care on its governing board. 344 Similar
public authorities have been established for HCAs and/or home-based
childcare workers by ballot initiative in Oregon (2000) 345 and Washington
(2002), 346 by a state regulatory authority in Michigan (2004), 347 by
executive order in Illinois 348 and by legislative enactment in Massachusetts
(2006). 349
The enabling legislation for these public authorities expressly
recognizes that the employment relationship of HCAs is a triangular one,
involving workers, employers who benefit directly from the work of the
health care aides, and an LMI, the public authority. 350 Recently enacted
public authority statutes and gubernatorial orders preserve the health care
recipient/employer’s right to hire, fire, and supervise while authorizing the
public authority to bargain collectively with the union as representative of
the HCAs. 351 The public authority functions on the union-organized hiring
hall model, serving the dual role of LMI and employer of record. The union
negotiates the terms of deployment of HCAs with the public authority
which, in turn, acts as representative of the thousands of individual
employers whom the HCAs actually do work for. The unionized public
authority model provides an example of how state intervention can create
and effectively regulate a labor market intermediary to improve both the
work conditions and delivery of services in a contemporary high velocity
labor market.
D. Constructing New Non-Exploitive Labor Market Intermediaries::
344. Id. at 14-16.
345. See OR. REV. STAT. § 410.612 (2008) (establishing that “[f]or purposes of collective
bargaining . . . the Home Care Commission is the employer of record for home care workers”).
346. See WASH. REV. CODE § 74.39A.220-.903 (2008) (codifying Initiative Measure No. 775 and
establishing a public home care quality authority to collectively bargain with a representative union of
PCAs).
347. See Michigan Department of Community Health, Beneficiary Eligibility Bulletin (Nov. 23,
2004), available at <http://www.michigan.gov/documents/HCEP_04-07_110034_7.pdf> (regarding the
establishment of the Michigan Quality Community Care Council as an independent government agency
to provide the right to collectively bargain for home care attendants); see also Michigan Quality
Community Care Council, <http://www.mqccc.org/ portal> (last visited on Aug. 9, 2009).
348. Ill. Exec. Order 2005-1 (2005), available at <www.illinois.gov/gov/pdfdocs/exe corder20051.pdf> (governing day care workers).
349. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, §§ 28-33 (2008) (home healthcare attendants).
350. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.118G, § 28 (expressly identifying the consumer or consumer
surrogate, the workforce council, a statutorily limited employer of record, and the personal care
attendant as parties in the employment relationship).
351. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 118G, § 31 (giving the consumer employer status stating that
consumers or consumer surrogates “retain the right to select, hire, schedule, train, direct, supervise and
terminate” PCAs provided to them by the workforce council).
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Immigrant Organizing in the Informal Economy
Immigrant day laborers and their advocates are devising responses to
high-velocity contingent labor markets that have important implications for
regulating profit-driven LMIs. Historically, the employer-sanctioned shapeup was the classic market response to the running of contingent labor
markets in the absence of some type of LMI. Workers would gather, or
“shape-up,” daily on the docks or in front of packing houses vying with
each other for short-term, low-wage jobs. 352 The shape-up, a crude and
exploitive means of hiring temporary labor associated with an earlier
industrial era, is again a common fixture of the urban landscape as
immigrant day laborers gather each day on street corners and in home
center parking lots to compete for construction jobs, landscaping, and
domestic work 353 as did poor and immigrant workers one hundred years
ago. The shape-up, albeit located at the temp agency office, is also the
common hiring method at low-end temporary agencies that have
proliferated in urban immigrant communities, providing labor for
manufacturing, construction, food processing, and other manual jobs. 354
The revival of the shape-up is emblematic of the rise of the so-called
“informal economy” where millions of undocumented immigrant workers
are employed “off the books” or illegally classified as independent
contractors in construction, landscaping, restaurant, and domestic jobs. 355
The core structure of this labor market recapitulates a central feature of
American capitalism’s bygone industrial era – the marginal employment
and super-exploitation of a vulnerable, largely immigrant, low-wage labor
pool. 356
In response to the growth of the informal contingent labor market, the
organization of immigrant laborers has mushroomed. Backed by organized
labor, the recently-formed National Day Laborers Organizing Network
(NDLON) has undertaken a nationwide effort to defend the rights of
workers who seek employment on street corners across America, at temp
352. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 1933-1941: TURBULENT
YEARS 254-56 (1970).
353. See ABEL VALENZUELA ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (UCLA
Center for the Study of Urban Poverty Working Paper, 2006), available at <http://
www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/uploaded_files/Natl_DayLabor-On_the_Corner1.pdf> (last visited Aug.
9, 2009).
354. See BARLEY & KUNDA, supra note 39; Kerr & Dole, supra note 39, at 91-92; Jamie Peck &
Nik Theodore, Contingent Chicago, Restructuring the Spaces of Temporary Labor, 25 INT’L J. URBAN
& REG. RES. 471 (2001).
355. See, e.g., BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 40, at 10-25 (reporting on the geographic landscape
of unregulated work in New York City).
356. See id.; see also PECK, supra note 100, at 8-11.
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agencies, and through informal chains of labor agents operating across
America. 357 At the local level, workers centers are partnering with unions
and central labor councils to develop mutually advantageous joint strategies
and affiliations. 358 For instance, an on-the-ground campaign is underway,
jointly planned by NDLON and the Laborers International Union, to
improve the conditions of thousands of undocumented immigrants working
in major urban housing construction markets in California. 359 Organized
efforts addressing the problems of day labor are routinely leading to the
establishment of worker centers, i.e. multi-faceted grass-roots institutions,
which provide immigrant day laborers and others working in the informal
economy with job-referral services and legal representation on matters such
as wage and hour violations, immigrant rights, and a collective means of
addressing common-workplace ills. 360 In addition, in some areas,
municipally sanctioned hiring locations allow day laborers to gain some
measure of control over hiring and the terms of employment in order to
rationalize job placement and allow for the enforcement of decent wages
and working conditions for day laborers. 361
NDLON and most worker centers are primarily rooted in immigrant
communities and focus on representing the interests of the growing
transnational workforce, now estimated to include ten million
undocumented workers. 362 NDLON’s strategy of street-corner organizing
targets the humiliating competition for work that inheres to unregulated
357. NDLON signed a formal partnership agreement with the AFL-CIO in August, 2006 to address
the abysmal conditions confronting day laborers. AFL-CIO Press Release, AFL-CIO and NDLON,
Largest Organization of Workers Centers, Enter Watershed Agreement to Improve Conditions of
Working Families (Aug. 9, 2006), available at <http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/pr
08092006.cfm> (last visited Aug. 9, 2009). NDLON made a similar arrangement with Change to Win,
the loose federation of unions which left the AFL-CIO. See National Day Laborer Organizing Network,
History of NDLON, <http://www.ndlon.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45&
Itemid=73> (last visited on Aug. 9, 2008) (providing history of NDLON and its affiliation with the
AFL-CIO and Change to Win.)
358. Of noted significance, a workers’center in Springfield, Massachusetts, Casa Obrera, has
become formally affiliated with the Pioneer Valley Central Labor Council (AFL-CIO), the
coordinating body for the city’s AFL-CIO affiliated unions. <http:www.a-dp.org/documents/media
coverage/june11republican.pdf> (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
359. UCLA Center for Labor Research and Education, Organizing in the Building Trades, LAB.
EDUC. NEWS, Summer/Fall 2007, at 6, available at <http://www.labor.ucla.edu/publications/news
letters/pdfs/07sumfall.pdf> (last visited on Aug. 9, 2008).
360. See FINE, supra note 21.
361. Id. at 113.
362. The most comprehensive study of worker centers indicates the following nationality
breakdown for the workers organized by centers: 45 percent Central and South American, 12 percent
East Asian, another 12 percent Caribbean, 6 percent African, and 22 percent native-born with the
remainder coming from Europe and other Asian countries. See FINE supra note 20, at 20-21. In his
study of street-corner day laborers in Los Angeles, sociologist Abel Valenzuela et al. estimate that the
vast majority of the 20,000 day laborers on street corners in that city are Hispanic. Valenzuela et al.,
supra note 355, at iii.
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labor markets and informal hiring sites where it is routine for employers to
violate wage and hour law by hiring at sub-minimum wages and breaking
commitments to pay workers the full wage promised for their labor. 363
Moral suasion aimed at voluntary employer compliance with the demands
of day laborers, public protest exposing anti-worker practices, and legal
action to enforce wage and hour laws are all part of the worker center
model. The rising consciousness of day laborers combined with the social
weight of the sponsors of the worker centers – often religious
organizations, unions and legal service organizations – provide a variety of
means of enforcing better wages and working conditions for those who use
the centers. 364
Of particular importance to our discussion, some worker centers and
NDLON affiliates have taken on the role of LMIs. Janice Fine, a leading
chronicler of the worker center movement, defines worker centers as
“community-based mediating institutions that provide support to low-wage
workers.” 365 The market mediating functions assumed by centers include
policing shape-up sites, leading campaigns to strike down ordinances
banning public solicitation by workers for jobs, and in some municipalities,
forming nascent hiring halls. 366 NDLON and worker centers have also
defended the right of day laborers to solicit work in public venues without
interference, crackdowns, or raids by local and federal authorities. 367 A
coordinated push to enact local laws that create safe space for day laborers
has taken two approaches. The first is to require home centers like Home
Depot and Lowe’s to designate areas in their parking lots where day
laborers can gather to bring a modicum of concerted pressure on employers
and have access to sanitary facilities. 368 Most notably, in August, 2008, an
NDLON-led effort resulted in the Los Angeles City Council unanimously
enacting an ordinance requiring certain “big-box” home improvement
stores to construct day labor centers with shelter, drinking water,
bathrooms, and trash cans on their properties. 369 Alternatively, some
363. See Common Ground: A Study Conducted by the National Day Laborers’ Organizing
Network, Written in Conjunction with Sue McCarty and George Faraday, University of Maryland
School of Law Labor Law Clinic. <http://www.ndlon.org/resources/CommonGroundReport-Eng.pdf>
(visited Sept. 21, 2009).
364. See id.
365. FINE, supra note 21, at xii n.2.
366. Id. at 113-15.
367. See FINE, supra note 21, at 113.
368. See Steve Greenhouse, Front Line in Day Labor Fight Runs Right Outside Home Depot, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at A16.
369. Anna Gorman, Day Laborer Rule Okd: L.A. Adopts Day Laborer Rules for Home
Improvement Stores, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at 3; see Los Angeles Ordinance 180,174 (2008)
(codified at L.A. MUN. CODE art. I, ch. 12.24(U)(14)), available at <http://clkrep.lacity.org/
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municipalities are designating First Amendment protected public sites,
where day laborers can organize free of harassment. Facing ruthless
employers and aggressive enforcement of immigration law by the
Department of Homeland Security, worker centers continue to evolve new
strategic means of protecting the rights of immigrant day laborers in order
to “remov[e] some perversity from the status quo, in which the benefits of
illegal immigration largely flow to unscrupulous employers.” 370
Accordingly, worker centers may evolve into widely utilized new forms of
worker-sponsored LMIs that attempt to put in place institutional solutions
for contingent labor that offer an alternative to market-driven temp
agencies that deploy workers to construction, manufacturing, landscaping,
and other unskilled jobs.
Unfortunately, the structure and trajectory of the worker center
phenomena create the possibility that the centers will fall squarely within
the regime of regulation which already cabins the effectiveness and reach
of the worker centers’ more mature institutional cousin, the union hiring
hall. As labor attorney David Rosenfeld has noted, the extreme sweep of
the NLRA’s definition of labor organization 371 arguably subjects most
worker centers to the NLRA’s prohibitions on certain kinds of strikes,
pickets, boycotts, and the ability to negotiate pre-hire agreements with
employers outside of the construction industry. 372 Indeed, New York City
restaurant employers responded to a campaign by a worker center, The
Restaurant Opportunity Center (ROC-NY) by filing complaints with the
NLRB. 373 The employers charged that ROC-NY was a labor organization
and committed a series of unfair labor practices. 374 Fortunately, the NLRB
General Counsel issued an Advisory Memo concluding that ROC-NY’s
representation of its members was not systematic enough to establish it as a
onlinedocs/2008/08-1657_ord_180174.pdf> (last viewed Aug. 9, 2009).
370. Street Corner Solidarity, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A22.
371. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2006) defines a labor organization as “any organization of any kind, or
any agency . . . which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work.”
372. David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers: Emerging Labor Organizations – Until They Confront the
National Labor Relations Act, 27 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP. L. 469, 471-82 (2006).
373. Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (Redeye Grill) Cases 2-CP-1067, 2-CB-20643
548-0100; Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (Fireman Hospitality Group Café Concepts,
Inc.), Cases 2-CP-1071, 2-CB-20705; Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (65th Street
Restaurant LLC d/b/a Restaurant Daniel) Cases 2-CP-1073; 2-CB-20787, NLRB Gen. Couns. Adv.
Mem. (Nov. 30, 2006), available at <http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_ files/Advice%20Memos/2006/2-CP1067.pdf> (last viewed Aug. 9, 2009).
374. The employers charged ROC-NY with “recognitional picketing in violation of Section
8(b)(7)(C); . . . attempts to force representation on employees absent majority support in violation of
Section 8(b)(1)(A); and [forcing] employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of ROCNY
membership in violation of Section 8(b)(2).” Id. at 1.
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labor organization. 375 However, the General Counsel’s memo did not
preclude such a finding in the future should a worker center’s conduct be
“shown to constitute a pattern or practice of dealing over time.” 376 In sum,
the current legal regime has the capacity to disadvantage and confine even
nascent worker-initiated, labor-based organizations that are interceding in
contingent labor markets as institutional alternatives to the commercial
temp agency.
Still, worker center advocates are the first to admit that their capacity
and organizing efforts are dwarfed by the immense size of the informal
economy. 377 Campaigns aimed at persuading day laborers to abandon the
street to “join” or make use of worker centers and hiring sites bumps up
against the large numbers of undocumented day laborers and the growing
market demand for their labor, compounded by anti-immigrant politics and
legislation. Nevertheless, the organizing of day laborers has focused
national attention on the routine abuses faced by the day labor workforce in
the informal economy and provides an ongoing moral, legal, and political
compass for those defending the rights of day laborers. 378
VII. CONCLUSION: RECONCEPTUALIZING THE LEGAL STATUS OF FORPROFIT LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES
Our conclusion offers a set of proposals to redress the grievances of
the growing workforce deployed by the for-profit temp agency industry and
to create a level legal playing field so that more nonstandard workers can
choose to find work through union hiring halls and other not-for-profit
LMIs that are developing as alternatives. We start with an assessment of
the strengths and shortcomings of recent legislative initiatives designed to
regulate abusive temp agency practices and end with a set of legal reforms
that reconceptualize the legal status of commercial temp agencies to bring
transparency to their mediating functions and to regulate the hidden fees
they charge.
A. Advances in Regulating For-Profit Labor Market Intermediaries: the
Day Labor Statutes
At least eight states now have statutes specifically regulating some

375.
376.
377.
378.

Id. at 3.
Id.
See FINE, supra note 21, at 102.
Rosenfeld, supra note 374, at 477.
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aspect of the temp agency industry. 379 Most aim to curtail the abusive
treatment of low-wage day laborers in specific by remedying violations of
minimum wage standards, protecting health and safety, and preventing
agencies from monopolizing access to employment. A key provision in
most temp agency/day labor statutes outlaws mandatory deductions that
cause wages to fall below minimum wage. This includes required
transportation costs to or from the actual worksite 380 and charges for
required safety equipment 381 or mandatory check cashing privileges. 382
Temp agency statutes use different means to address the fact that temp
workers are often hired to perform the most dangerous work at a job site.
Illinois requires at the time of dispatch that a day labor agency provide a
written statement to the worker indicating the nature of the work to be
performed and whether equipment is provided. 383 Georgia mandates both
that the temp agency (termed a “labor pool”) and the work site employer
inform the worker if the job involves exposure to hazardous chemicals and
that they obtain written consent from the worker before the job
commences. 384 Four states prevent temp agencies from using restrictive
covenants or other contractual arrangements to prevent or constrain
workers from moving to “permanent” employment with the client firm.
These statutes prohibit a temp agency from restricting the right of a day
laborer to accept a full-time job from a client-employer or from prohibiting
the client-employer from offering a temp worker deployed to its workplace
a full-time job. 385
Enforcement provisions vary. Some states promote enforcement with
379. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-551 to 553 (2008); FLA. STAT. §§ 448.20 to 448.26 (2008);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-10-1 to 34-10-2 (2008), 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/1-99 (2008); MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ch. 149, § 159C (2008); N.M. STAT. §§ 50-15-1 to 15-7 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 286.10-1 to 6.10-5 (2008);TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 92.001 to 92.031 (Vernon 2007); see also National
Employment Law Project, supra note 303.
380. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 149 § 159C (prohibiting charging transportation fees from
the agency or labor pool site to the work location)
381. Charging fees for safety equipment is banned in three states: Texas (TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §
92.025), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 34-10-2), and Florida (FLA. STAT. § 448.24).
382. ARIZ. REV. ST. ANN. § 44-1362; FLA. STAT. § 448.25; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/30(d); N.M.
STAT. §50-15-5; TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 92.023.
383. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/25.
384. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-10-3.
385. Notably, the American Staffing Association stresses the temp industy’s right to impose such
restrictions on its employees’ freedom of movement based on the claim that the agencies have the “right
to be free from unlawful interference with their employee relationships.” American Staffing
Association, <http://www.staffingtoday.net/legaland government/issue_papers.cfm> (last visited May
25, 2009). But Arizona (ARIZ. REV. ST. ANN. § 25-553), Florida (FLA. STAT. § 448.24), Illinois (820
ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/40), and New Mexico (N.M. STAT. §50-15-4(D)) expressly prohibit such
restrictions, long common in the temp industry. Florida, Illinois and New Mexico do, however, permit a
temp agency to collect a placement fee when a worker takes a direct-hire job with a user firm. FLA.
STAT. § 448.24; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/40; N.M. STAT. §50-15-4(D).
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recordkeeping requirements and an obligation to provide detailed pay
statements to temp workers. 386 But only three states have statutory
provisions that create a private right of action for temp workers to enforce
the law; 387 the other states all require that state agencies initiate
enforcement action. Texas and New Mexico make enforcement especially
challenging by making a violation of its temp agency statutes a criminal
misdemeanor, thus requiring the state to prove a knowing or intentional
violation to enforce the statute. 388
On the federal level, U.S. Congressman Luis Guttierrez (D-IL)
introduced the Day Laborer Fairness and Protection Act (DLFPA) in
2003, 389 reviving Congressional attempts to regulate the use of day laborers
and other contingent workers who “provide employers with a flexible
workforce and contribute significantly to interstate commerce.” 390
Although DLFPA, like the state laws discussed above, limits its reach to
manual day labor, it is more comprehensive than any of the state bills and
contains more stringent regulatory language to govern temp agency
employment and street-corner hiring. DFLPA defends the First
Amendment rights of day laborers to solicit work on corners, prohibits
temp agencies from charging a fee to workers who accept permanent
employment, and bans charging day laborers fees for transportation from
the point of hire to the workplace. In addition, the bill contains an antiretaliation provision to prevent employers from calling immigration agents
when day laborers assert their rights under the act. The bill also provides a
private right of action and a ban on deploying day laborers as
strikebreakers. 391
Importantly, recent laws regulating the temp agency industry identify
the distinct role of staffing agencies in the triangular employment
relationship 392 and the particular vulnerability of day laborers 393 as the
basis for regulating the industry. Notably, these statutes subject the profitdriven temporary help agency to some level of regulation while expressly
386. FLA. STAT. § 448.24(e); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-10-2(4); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/12; N.M.
STAT. §50-15-6(B).
387. FLA. STAT. § 448.25; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-10-3(c), 32-10-4; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
175/95.
388. N.M. STAT. § 50-15-7; TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 92.031.
389. H.R. 2870, 108th Cong. (2003).
390. Id. at § 2(7).
391. Id. at §§ 16, 18.
392. E.g. Illinois’ Day and Temporary Labor Services Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/5 defines a
day and temporary labor service agency as “any person or entity engaged in the business of employing
day or temporary laborers to provide services, for a fee, to or for any third party client pursuant to a
contract with the day and temporary labor service and the third party client.”
393. See, e.g., id. 175/2.
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excluding from their coverage union hiring halls and not-for-profit worker
centers. However, with one exception, all statutes regulating temp agencies
protect only unskilled manual laborers. Temp agencies that employ clerical
workers, semi-skilled workers, professionals, and agricultural workers are
beyond the reach of these laws, 394 which thus protect only about 35 percent
of the workforce deployed by the commercial temp industry. 395
Consequently, even the minimal requirements in the Illinois and Texas
statutes mandating that temp agencies register with a state agency 396 only
apply to temp agencies that deploy manual unskilled workers, excluding
most temps who work outside the fields of construction and manufacturing.
The state laws and proposed federal legislation summarized above are
aimed primarily at preventing temp agencies from violating work laws
already on the books that have been difficult to enforce in the non-standard
temporary employment agency setting, e.g. compliance with minimum
wage requirements and health and safety rules. As such, they offer a
critically needed, if extremely patchy, floor to protect highly vulnerable
low-wage day laborers from the inscrutable practices of LMIs in a largely
unregulated labor market. Still, they fall far short of covering the range of
needed protections that were contained in state employment laws early in
the twentieth century 397 or those protections that community temp worker
organizing efforts have called for in their proposed “codes of conduct” for
the temp industry. 398 Even the more comprehensive provisions in the
proposed DLFPA – which states that its purpose is to ensure “workplace
dignity” and to reduce the “unfair competitive advantage for firms that
abuse day laborers” 399 – severely underutilize the government’s regulatory
power in this area.
Most notably, neither state laws currently on the books nor the
proposed federal bill squarely address the most exploitive feature of temp
394. This shortcoming, i.e. the narrow focus of the low-wage manual labor sector, has been a
feature of proposed regulation for the industry since the early 1970s. See Befort, supra note 13, at 15458; National Employment Law Project, supra note 303. No doubt this narrow focus reflects practical
political considerations concerning the prospects for passage, yet it is also based on the assumption that
“high-end” temp workers are not exploited, a premise the authors of this article reject as factually
inaccurate and misguided at a policy level.
395. The American Staffing Association reports that the percentages of temp workers by industry
are 35.1 percent industrial, 7.8 percent health care, 21 percent managerial, 20.4 percent office-clerical,
and 15.7 percent technical-IT. AmericanStaffing.net, Staffing Statistics, <www.americanstaffing.net/
statistics/images/downloads/SES/StaffingSurveyfigure1_2006.jpg> (last visited on May 30, 2009).
396. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/45; TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 92.011.
397. See supra Part III B.
398. For example, New York greengrocers agreed to create a voluntary code of conduct which
included guidelines for treatment of day laborers in the grocery industry. See Local237.com,
<http://www.local237.com/newsline/2006/0906_2.html> (last visited May 30, 2009).
399. H.R. 2870, 108th Cong. (2003).
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industry employment, the hidden fee or mark-up which flows to the temp
agency as a result of the difference between the wage rate of the temp
worker and the contract price paid by the user firm for the “service”
provided by the temp agency. No matter how this difference is
characterized, i.e. as a hidden fee charged to the temp worker or as the
mark-up or fee charged to the client firm, this differential accounts for the
patent disparity between the wages and benefits of temp workers and those
of “regular” employees who perform equivalent or comparable work.
B. Legal Recognition of the Temp Agency’s Dual Status: Creating
Transparency and Regulating Fee-Charging
The fact that regulation of fee-charging is not part of the ongoing
policy debate on temp agency labor speaks to the failure of current efforts
to address the underlying economics of the for-profit staffing industry and
the flexible economy. Beyond the augmented profits immediately accrued
from the use of temp labor, the dynamics of the two-tiered internal labor
markets created by the temp industry and its clients over time weakens the
bargaining position and diminishes the wage gains of all workers, both
temp and standard. The impoverished dialogue regarding the social ills that
result from the unregulated use of LMIs is best appreciated by considering
that it was a century ago when the IWW first popularized the slogan,
“Don’t Buy Jobs!” 400 in order to highlight fee-charging as the core social ill
associated with for-profit LMIs. This was not merely anarchist
sloganeering. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis forcefully argued in
his dissent in Adams v. Tanner that allowing workers to pay a fee to an
employment agency for access to the job market was antithetical to
fundamental American values. 401 As late as 1971, in the course of hearings
on the proposed Day Labor Protection Act, 402 the issue of the fee was still
being publicly debated. Senator Walter Mondale spoke forcefully about the
“unconscionable fees” which the young temp agency industry extracted
from agency temp workers, condemning the fact that “there are no controls
or limits on what private temporary help supply firms may . . . charge for
what are in substance placement fees.” 403
Senator Mondale’s concerns were not heeded. By that time, the

400. See FELLOW WORKERS AND FRIENDS, supra note 119, at 30.
401. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 597-614 (Brandeis, J. dissenting); see also supra note 133
and accompanying text.
402. H.R. 10349, 92d Cong. (1971) was never enacted. Similar bills failed in the face of stiff
opposition from the temp industry in 1975 and 1987.
403. 117 Cong. Rec. 28, S36653 (1971).
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largely-ignored lobbying efforts of the newly formed industry trade group
had created the legal groundwork for the rise of the modern temp agency,
altering the states’ employment agency laws to avoid any controls or limits
on the temporary agencies’ hidden fee- charging structure, setting the legal
framework for the industry’s rapid growth in the last quarter of the
twentieth century. This change in the legal environment, amounting to
industry deregulation, occurred without real public debate. 404
Consequently, the crude amendments to state employment agency law
effectively eliminated the agency markup from the definition of fee, not
only in the statute books, but more importantly in the public mind. By
inscribing in the law the notion that the temp industry was simply another
employer in the job market and charged no fees to workers, the temp
industry was able to reframe the public presentation of the temporary
staffing industry as a free “service.” The far-reaching consequences of
merely altering the legal definition of what constituted an employment
agency by creating a separate legal category for “temporary help service
firm” powerfully illustrates William Forbath’s argument that the language
of law can have a powerful and formative effect on consciousness and on
the working class’s ability to imagine and create alternative structures of
workplace governance. 405
Eliminating the legal discourse of fee charging, of course, does not
change the economic realities of temp agency work. Profits are still derived
from the difference between the hourly rate a client firm pays the temp
agency for “using” a worker and the wage paid. 406 The temp industry, of
course, can legally proclaim to workers it recruits that it never charges any
temp worker a fee, claiming that all fees are paid by the client firms. 407 But,
as we demonstrated above, the formalistic logic of this position is belied by
the actual dynamics of “cost-saving” and wage setting in the industry. 408
Moreover, the high turnover rate and extreme degree of job mobility
in the temp industry labor market work to undermine the development of a
collective workplace identity and make it difficult for temps to act in a
concerted fashion to address workplace ills. 409 In short, there are only
nominal market forces to counter the inexorable drive to lower wages and
reduce benefits for workers employed by the for-profit temp agency
404. Supra Part V.
405. See generally WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 167-73 (1993).
406. Fernandez-Mateo, supra note 71, at 293.
407. See Gonos, supra note 48, at 589-91.
408. See supra Part II.C.
409. See ROGERS, supra note 29, at 126.

FREEMAN AND GONOS

2009]

11/20/2009 11:11:02 AM

TAMING THE EMPLOYMENT SHARKS

173

industry. Absent government regulation of the temp industry’s hidden fee
or markup and legal reforms that encourage organization and a stronger
collective voice for temps, there is little that can be done to reverse secondclass status of workers employed in this part of the contingent workforce.
The widespread institutionalization of contingent work arrangements
and the growing reliance on profit-driven LMIs offer sound reasons to
revive a discussion on how to regulate the operations of temp agencies,
and, in specific, the fees charged by them and other profit-driven LMIs. To
respond to this economic reality, we propose a regulatory system guided by
two underlying principles. First, legislation should establish a “bottom line”
of fair and transparent functioning of the commercial temp agency and
other similarly situated LMIs. Second, reforms of labor law should allow
for the unionization of temp workers deployed by for-profit LMIs, thus
leveling the playing field so that union sponsored LMIs can operate under a
set of market place rules comparable to those governing profit-driven
LMIs. Both sets of reform are predicated on crafting a legal definition of
the commercial LMI that captures its dual status as an employer of record
and, more importantly, as an employment agent or market intermediary.
Assigning the commercial LMI a dual legal status recognizes the economic
reality of the commercial LMI’s functions as being analogous to that of the
union hiring hall which the federal courts have defined as being both an
employment agent and an employer. 410 These two related reform proposals
eliminate the double standard that legally bifurcates the regulation of LMIs
– extensive federal oversight and regulation of union-run hiring halls on the
one hand, and a laissez-faire system for the profit-driven temp industry, on
the other. Moreover, these reforms complement and strengthen the
provisions of recently enacted and proposed temp agency laws by adding
an overarching and well-established legal principle that has long governed
the conduct of employment agents – a legislatively derived duty or
fiduciary-like obligation to disclose to workers the terms and conditions of
their deployment.
The first set of reforms can be easily accomplished by reviving the
once-expansive reach of state employment agency statutes. By again
including commercial LMIs in the definition of employment agencies,
these statutes would provide a framework to mandate disclosure of fee
schedules, i.e. the contractual terms temp agencies negotiate with client
firms that would allow temp workers to identify the markup or fee being
made by the temp agency. A second and related requirement is the
institution of fee ceilings to regulate the rate of exploitation in the labor410. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
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only employment contract by limiting the mark up to a certain percentage
of the hourly wage paid. Fulfilling this obligation might require temp
agencies to, for example, provide workers with written receipts specifying
not just pay rates and other terms of employment, but also the difference
between the wages paid a temp worker and the amount the agency is
receiving from the user firm. Regulation could require the use of objective
standards to determine which workers are referred to preferred jobs and in
what order they are deployed. Such standards are common in the contracts
governing the deployment of workers through union hiring halls. In sum,
crafting a statutory provision defining for-profit LMIs as employment
agents and establishing a concomitant set of legal obligations owed to temp
workers would impose an enforceable level of transparency on temp
agencies comparable to that which is required of private sector union hiring
halls under federal law and of the public authorities deploying HCAs under
state laws and union-sponsored collective bargaining agreements.
A second set of reforms is needed so that federal labor law can
effectively protect the rights of non-standard workers employed through
temp agencies in high velocity labor markets. The use of union-sponsored
LMIs is thwarted by the NLRB’s crabbed interpretation of the joint
employer doctrine. 411 Collective bargaining rights for temps requires that
the NLRB revive and expand the rule applied in M.B. Sturgis. 412 As it now
stands, accreting temp workers into established bargaining units or
organizing temp workers alongside standard workers requires the assent of
the temp agency and the user employer. 413 This rule rests on the presumed
legal status of the temp agency as an independent employer rather than an
LMI. Crediting the temp agency as the prime employer of temp workers
creates an illogical obstacle to recognizing the community of interest
shared by temp and permanent workers at their common locus of
production or service work.
Statutory reform of labor law is also needed to broaden the reach of
section 8(f) of the NLRA 414 to permit unions to negotiate pre-hire
agreements in high velocity and seasonal labor markets outside the
construction industry. 415 Flexible labor markets throughout the economy
now mirror the seasonal or intermittent employment that characterizes the
construction industry, justifying the expansion of the pre-hire agreement
411. See supra Part V.A, B.
412. See supra Part VI.
413. Id.
414. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f).
415. See STONE, supra note 1, at 238; Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lee W. Jackson, Union Survival
Strategies for the Twenty-First Century, 12 LAB. LAW. 165, 172-73 (1996).
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wherever temporary labor is used. The logic of this proposal rests on the
policy that underlies Congress’ decision to exempt the construction
industry from the NLRA’s prohibition against pre-hire agreements:
recognition that short-term and transient employment patterns make
ordinary patterns of union organizing practically impossible. 416
Currently, commercial staffing agencies regularly enter into contracts
with user firms that function exactly like union negotiated pre-hire
agreements. Moreover, commercial LMIs can negotiate and enforce what
are in effect exclusive “closed shop” hiring arrangements that allow temp
agencies to serve as exclusive gatekeepers to certain job markets. 417 The
statutory text of the NLRA – concerned only with the contractual
agreements between labor organizations and employers – turns a blind eye
to staffing industry practices which are outside the purview of labor. As a
result, the statutory framework of federal labor law handicaps the labor
movement’s ability to use pre-hire agreements to mount organizing
campaigns among temporary and transient workforces outside the
construction industry. And, of course, unions are prohibited in all cases
from instituting a closed shop. Reforming section 8(f) of the NLRA to
permit unions to negotiate pre-hire agreements in any labor market where
temp workers make up a significant portion of the labor force would bring
occupational unionism and hiring hall structures to a host of industries that
routinely use temp agency workers to meet rapidly shifting schedules or
staffing requirements. This would be a significant step to level the playing
field so that union-sponsored LMIs could effectively compete in the
private-sector’s ever-expanding, non-standard labor markets monopolized
by for-profit staffing agencies.
Finally, using the state’s regulatory power to challenge the dominance
of the for-profit temp agency requires reconsideration of the Progressive
reformers’ call for public labor exchanges to challenge commercial LMIs.
In this regard, expanding the home care workforce model now in use in
California, Michigan, and other states provides a model for other high
mobility labor markets. The home health care LMI provides a proven
institutional structure that operates in high mobility labor markets but
alleviates the exploitive hidden fee that burdens workers deployed through
commercial LMIs.
Reform of workplace law to improve the conditions of contingent and

416. See van Jaarsveld, supra note 10, at 357-63.
417. Indeed, provisions of the temp agency statutes enacted by some states address an aspect of this
problem by banning any contractual provisions that prevent a temp worker from accepting a permanent
position with the client firm where he performs work. See supra note 387.
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low-wage workers may seem far off. Indeed, courts have eschewed a
rights-expanding interpretation of federal workplace law, and legislative
initiatives to revise workplace law have fared no better. 418 American
workplace law has been seen as being relatively impermeable to
substantive revision. 419 But the force of social movements can quickly
change the mood and views of legislators and judges, as demonstrated by
the rapid adoption of legal reforms following the labor movement’s popular
upsurge in the early 1930s. It is of course difficult to predict when a major
upsurge will occur. Consider that virtually no labor activists or academics
predicted the gigantic 2006 May Day demonstrations and general strike for
immigrant rights which was led, in part, by activists affiliated with worker
centers and day labor organizations like NDLON. 420 Organized labor and
its allies are involved in ongoing discussions on how to organize for and
anticipate the next working class upsurge or social movement that has the
potential to shift the balance of class forces in the U.S. 421 It is during these
upsurges that fundamental legal reform becomes possible. 422 Our hope is
that this essay provides some tools that will be useful when the next
upsurge makes possible a new legal paradigm to challenge the exploitation
of temp workers by commercial staffing agencies and allow for the
expansion of non-exploitive, alternative intermediaries for the nonstandard
labor force.

418. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1558-69
(2002).
419. See id.
420. See Ines Ferre et al., Thousands March for Immigrant Rights, CNN, May 1, 2006,
<http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/01/immigrant.day/index.html>.
421. See DAN CLAWSON, THE NEXT UPSURGE: LABOR AND THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 194205 (2003).
422. See James G. Pope et al., The Employee Free Choice Act and a Long-term Strategy for
Winning Workers’ Rights, 11WORKING USA: J. LAB. & SOC’Y 125, 131-40 (2008).

